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THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION THEORY, THE
HAMILTON AFFAIR, AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES
JONATHAN TURLEY*
The impeachment and subsequent acquittal of President William
J. Clinton has rekindled debate as to the scope of the
Impeachment Clause. In a recent essay in this Law Review, and
again in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
Professor Daniel H. Pollitt argued that the debates surrounding
the Constitution's creation and ratification, as well as past
impeachment cases, indicate that the Framers intended to limit
application of the Clause to abuses of official authority and great
crimes committed against the state. In this responsive article,
Professor Jonathan Turley disputes the existence of intentionalist
support for an "executive function" theory of impeachment,
arguing that the historical record indicates that the Framers did
not intend to limit application of the Clause to misconduct related
to office.
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"No doubt this is all a bit absurd, and yet it makes clear what
I wish to show you, if I somehow can, in order to persuade
you to change your position .... Do I in any way persuade
you to change your position... ? Or will you not change
your position any more even if I tell many other myths like
... this?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps fitting that the most modem of Plato's dialogues,
the Gorgias, should focus on mythology and legal argument.2
1. Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth: Reflections on Plato's Gorgias, 74 IOWA L. REV.
787, 793 (1989) (quoting PLATO, GORGIAs 493c-d (adapting translation from 1 THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO 231,280 (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press 1984))).
2. The Gorgias explores the conflict between dialectic and rhetoric in argument. It is
often viewed as the most relevant dialogue for legal argument and the art of persuasion.
See James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer,
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES
Socrates's statement to Callicles is intended to reform Callicles in his
inclination to criminal and hedonistic acts through the telling of myths
about the dangers of his course of action.3 It is the purest use of
mythology-to lead the listener back to a point of social order or
compliance.4 Mythology has long been identified as playing a central
role in the development of cultural norms and social structures.
Myths can be used to terrify or to inspire. They are, however, usually
used for a purpose beyond the simple allegorical narrative. While
myths often are eschewed as primitive in comparison to the objective
rationality of law, the law has its share of mythologies that serve the
same functions as their non-legal counterparts. Preeminent among
these are constitutional mythologies. With a limited text and limited
historical record of debate, the Constitution inevitably spawns
mythologies around its language and meaning. Since the language is
often ambiguous, interpretations are sometimes presented as
reflections of underlying morals or themes, powerful but unseen in
the constitutional text.
Mythology is a human response to shaping our perceived
realities, "ultimately validating the way we look at the world."'
Myths are often methods used to create orthodoxy by "abolishing
complexities and creating a 'blissful clarity.' "6 Such mythologies
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 850 (1983) ("In the Gorgias Plato focuses upon two contrasting
ways of speaking, of being, and of establishing community with others, both of which can
be described as forms of argument: 'rhetoric,' which he attacks, and 'dialectic,' which he
defends and intends to exemplify.").
3. See Weinrib, supra note 1, at 793-94 (noting that "myth aims at inducing others to
do what the speaker wants.... For Socrates, no less than for his interlocutors, rhetoric is a
tool of domination not generically different from outright coercion").
4. Professor James Boyd White describes Callicles, a highly regarded practitioner of
the rhetorician's art, in terms that have some resonance in contemporary legal arguments:
Callicles... rejects the very language of morality upon which Socrates' refutation
depends. He seeks to avoid the traps and limits of the language of his culture by
standing outside it, claiming the power to remake his language to coincide with
reality as he sees it.... Callicles' substantive position is one of radical hedonism:
according to what he calls natural justice and excellence ....
White, supra note 2, at 858 (1983).
5. Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of
Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457,457 (1996).
6. In their work on mythologies and gender, Professors Judith Brown, Lucy
Williams, and Phyllis Baumann note:
Myths can ... be reductive, abolishing complexities and creating a "blissful
clarity." Myths can be symbolic or distortive, positivie or negative, descriptive or
normative. Operating in our minds often without our being aware of them,
myths can make even the most historically contingent ideas seem universal,
natural, and inevitable. Thus, myths serve ideology and can perpetuate
orthodoxy, legitimating a particular point of view and often relieving us of the
burden of critical thinking.
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were in great supply during the Clinton impeachment hearings and
Senate trial. Various scholars advanced constitutional and historical
claims directed at a single point: the fallacy of impeachment
allegations against William Jefferson Clinton. The mythological
appeared to overwhelm the constitutional in the unprecedented
hearing held by the House Judiciary Committee in which nineteen
witnesses7 testified on the history and meaning of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." 8 I had the privilege of testifying at that hearing with
Professor Daniel Pollitt,9 an academic rightfully considered one of our
most respected authorities on the Constitution and its history.10
Professor Pollitt's testimony closely mirrored the conclusions reached
I&d at 458 (footnotes omitted).
7. These witnesses included seventeen academics, a former U.S. Attorney General,
and a former U.S. Justice Department official. They were: William Van Alstyne,
Professor of Law, Duke University; Griffin B. Bell, former U.S. Attorney General; Susan
Low Bloch, Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Charles J. Cooper, former U.S.
Department of Justice official; Robert F. Drinan, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University; Michael J. Gerhardt, Professor of Law, College of William & Mary; John C.
Harrison, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Matthew Holden, Jr.,
Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia; Forrest McDonald,
Historian and Distinguished University Research Professor, University of Alabama; Gary
L. McDowell, Director, Institute for United States Studies, University of London; John 0.
McGinnis, Professor of Law, Yeshiva University; Richard D. Parker, Williams Professor
of Law, Harvard University; Daniel H. Pollitt, Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger Professor
of Legal History, Northwestern University; Jack N. Rakove, Coe Professor of History and
American Studies, Stanford University; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of History,
City University of New York; Carl R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service
Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago; Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard University; and Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public
Interest Law, George Washington University. See Background and History of
Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. III (Nov. 9,1998) [hereinafter House Hearing].
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
9. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 203,250.
10. Professor Pollitt's scholarship is too varied and too extensive to recount in full but
his career has been the subject of various deserving tributes. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman,
In Appreciation: Daniel Hubbard Pollitt, 70 N.C. L. RFv. 1689 (1992); Kelvin L.
Newsome, In Appreciation: Daniel Hubbard Pollitt, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1696 (1992); Joseph
L. Rauh, Jr., In Appreciation: Daniel Hubbard Pollitt, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (1992); Judith
W. Wegner, In Appreciation: Daniel Hubbard Pollitt, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1692 (1992); see
also Frank Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges: An
Historical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87 (1970); Daniel H. Pollitt, The National Labor
Relations Board and Race Hate Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L.
Rnv. 373 (1965); Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Right to and Nature of
Representation Before Congressional Committees, 45 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1961); Daniel H.
Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of the First Sixty Days,
1960 DuKE L.J. 315; Daniel H. Pollitt, The Fifth Amendment Plea Before Congressional
Committees Investigating Subversion: Motives and Justifiable Presumptions-A Survey of
120 Witnesses, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1958).
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in his recent article in this publication." His views are shared by
other academics who testified before Congress or signed a joint letter
opposing impeachment on constitutional grounds. This article offers
a sharply different view of the cases and historical sources presented
in both Professor Pollitt's article and prior testimony (and, by
extension, the many academics supporting his interpretation of both
the Constitution and its history). 2
The constitutional accounts advanced in the impeachment
debate centered on the interpretation of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" in Article II of the Constitution. 3 At the time of the
impeachment hearing, President Clinton stood accused of criminal
acts in office designed to conceal a sexual relationship with a former
White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. As later expressed in four
proposed articles of impeachment, these alleged criminal acts
included perjury, suborning perjury, obstruction of justice, witness
tampering, abuse of power, and lying to Congress. 4 As the House
impeachment inquiry began, however, the White House and various
law professors and historians advanced a threshold argument:
Impeachment, they argued, would be improper in these circumstances
because the Framers intended "high crimes and misdemeanors" to
11. See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-up Under Oath.
Impeachable Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259 (1998).
12. It is due to my respect for Professor Pollitt's extensive scholarship that I am
confident that my criticism in this article will not be misconstrued. It is because Professor
Pollitt's theories are presented in the most complete and persuasive form that a response
is warranted. Rather than offer conclusory statements on the meaning of historical
records, Professor Pollitt offered a comprehensive academic foundation for his views. It is
this foundation that allows for the presentation of rival, but respectful, interpretations.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
14. See 144 CONG. REC. H11,774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998) (incorporating Article One,
which alleged that the President had "willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial
process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the
administration of justice [through his perjury before the grand jury]"; id. at H11,774
(incorporating Article Two, which alleged that the President had "willfully corrupted and
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and
exoneration, impeding the administration of justice [through his perjurous responses
during the discovery phase of the Paula Jones lawsuit]"); id. at H11,774-75 (incorporating
Article Three, which alleged that the President had "prevented, obstructed, and impeded
the administration of justice ... in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay,
impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to [the
Paula Jones lawsuit]"); id. at H11,775 (incorporating Article Four, which alleged that the
President "engaged in conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of his high office,
impaired the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries,
and contravened the authority of the legislative branch and the truth seeking purpose of a
coordinate investigative proceeding [through false statements to Congress]").
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encompass only misconduct related to official power or abuses of
office. 15 Specifically, this "executive function" theory excluded crimes
or misconduct related to private scandals or concerns. 6 At the House
Judiciary Committee hearing, the nineteen academics divided on this
question, with some academics-including this author-contesting
the textual, historical, and functional basis for such an
interpretation.1
7
Professor Pollitt and I can be described as polar opposites on the
spectrum of debate over the meaning of impeachment.
Unfortunately, the congressional debate did not permit us to engage
in a dialogue to test each other's theories and sources. 8 In the wake
of a political crisis, academics now will have the opportunity of
reflection and academic debate. For the first time, this exchange will
allow us to move beyond the rhetorical and to explore the specific
points of disagreement. This Article is divided into five parts. In Part
II, the Article briefly presents the theory offered by Professor Pollitt
15. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
17. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 28-44 (testimony and prepared statement of
Professor Gary McDowell); id. at 77-80 (testimony and prepared statement of Professor
John Harrison); id. at 91-98 (testimony and prepared statement of Professor Richard
Parker); id. at 103-11 (testimony and prepared statement of Professor John McGinnis); id.
at 116-28 (testimony and prepared statement of Professor Stephen Presser); id. at 180-94
(testimony and prepared statement of Charles Cooper); id. at 194-203 (testimony and
prepared statement of Griffin Bell); id. at 211-18 (testimony and prepared statement of
Professor Forrest McDonald); id. at 237-42 (testimony and prepared statement of
Professor William Van Alstyne); id. at 250-76 (testimony and prepared statement of
Professor Turley); see also Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the
House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Turley, Congress as
Grand Jury] (discussing the distinct role of the House of Representatives in the
impeachment process and suggesting an alternative interpretation of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" to the executive function theory); Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and
Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
Oct. 1999) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Turley, Factional Disputes]
(discussing the role of the Senate trial in impeachment as part of a Madisonian process
designed to regulate and transform factional disputes in the political system).
18. The Gorgias is a valuable work precisely because it is a dialogue in which ideas
could be explored and tested. In a telling passage of the Gorgias, Socrates cautions
Callicles that he has little interest in oratory but desires dialogue. See PLATO, GORGIAS
447c, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 1, at 231. Rejecting rhetoric in favor of
the dialectic, Socrates observes that a rhetorician has no need to know the truth of a
matter but, rather, "need[s] only to discover some trick of persuasion, so as to appear to
the unknowing to know more than those who know." Id. 459c, at 244. This clearly is not
the intention of Professor Pollitt, who has offered one of the most comprehensive defenses
of the executive function theory and has graciously supported the idea of this exchange to
advance the academic debate over the meaning and history of the impeachment standards.
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of an "executive function" theory of impeachment. 19  Part III
reexamines the basis and sources for the executive function theory.20
Part IV offers an analysis of past impeachment cases that differs
sharply from the analysis supporting the executive function theory.2'
Part V explores the remaining constitutional mythologies, including
the prominent use of the Hamilton affair to support the claim that the
Framers clearly rejected private conduct as a basis for impeachment.2
II. THE EXEcuTIvE FUNCTION THEORY AND THE DETERRENCE
THEORY OF IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES
Mythology depends not only on "logos," a perceived accurate
account, but also on "mythos," the persuasive telling of the account.3
It requires not only a consistent account but also an account widely
accepted for its intended influence on a society. Advocates for the
executive function theory wasted no time in articulating the theory
and then soliciting broad academic support for its telling. During the
Clinton hearings, two letters were submitted to the House Judiciary
Committee which were signed by more than 800 law professors and
historians attesting to the theory and its accuracy 4 These letters
gave the theory not simply the patina of general academic acceptance
but the legitimacy of a suggested constitutional pedigree found in the
clear language of the Framers and the cases of impeachmentO
Suddenly, the executive function theory and its supporting historical
accounts had immediate credibility as a generally accepted truth,
assisted by political forces intent on the theory taking hold. Like
19. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-119 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 120-311 and accompanying text.
22- See infra notes 312-362 and accompanying text.
23. See Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L.
REV. 111, 115 (1997).
24. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 334-39 (joint letter of the historians); id. at
374-83 (joint letter of the law professors).
25. Any citizen watching these debates and public statements would be left with little
question as to the impropriety of impeaching President Clinton on such charges as perjury
and obstruction of justice. When asked about academics who take an opposing view,
Professor Laurence Tribe stated:
Well, I suppose you can find people to argue just about anything, but I have
reviewed the 15 impeachments that the House of Representatives has voted in
the 201 years, and I've looked back to the origins of the term ["]high crimes and
misdemeanors["] in 14th century England, and I've looked at the history how
those words got into the Constitution. And I have no doubt that they were not
fair to do [sic] with lies about sex whether before a grand jury or anywhere else.
Early Edition: Tribe: Clinton Follies Don't Necessitate Impeachment (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 9,1998).
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cultural mythologies, constitutional mythologies often emerge to
meet the immediate needs of a social or political crisis. The executive
function theory, forged in the heat of the Clinton impeachment,
offered an academic explanation of how this painful crisis could be
avoided because of an inherent-but largely hidden-truth in our
constitutional history.
The Judiciary Committee hearing provided a relatively rare
opportunity for academics from across various legal, historical, and
political disciplines to debate the meaning of "high crimes and
misdemeanors." The hearing constituted the most comprehensive
and varied presentation in history on this central constitutional
phrase. While both sides of the question often relied on the same
sparse historical statements, widely different conclusions were
reached as to the scope of impeachable offenses. Even the historians
and law professors who supported the executive function theory
diverged on critical historical and theoretical points.
26
This author explored the different arguments of academics in
support of the executive function theory, as well as the alternative use
of a deterrent theory, in an earlier work?7 A few general points about
the theory, however, would be helpful in this critique. First, the
executive function theory advanced by various academics was neither
monolithic in its theoretical assumption nor necessarily consistent in
its application. The historians' letter offered a pure executive
function theory, ruling out any application of impeachment to
conduct that is not an extension of executive power or official abuse.
For instance, the historians ruled out any exception for offenses like
murder or rape which are unrelated to official duties or power. In
support of this claim, the historians asserted to Congress that "[t]he
Framers explicitly reserved [impeachment] for high crimes and
misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power."8 After this letter
26. Since these theories turned on the president's unique status in the constitutional
scheme, the theory can be dubbed an "executive function" theory since no general view of
judicial impeachable offenses was offered. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note
17 (manuscript at Part I.). Nevertheless, some academics (including Professor Pollitt) did
extend the logic of the executive function theory to judicial cases, a type of "judicial
function" variation. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 7, at 207-09 (prepared statement
of Professor Pollitt). A strong suggestion was made that, even with judicial officers,
impeachable offenses should exclude private conduct unrelated to their office. See id. at
207-08 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt). This extension to judicial impeachments,
however, was only sporadic among the academics supporting the narrow interpretation of
the impeachment language.
27. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.B.)
(discussing the specific historical and theoretical claims made in the two joint letters).
28. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 334 (joint letter of the historians) (emphasis
[Vol. 771798
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was submitted to Congress, however, some of the signatories, such as
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., offered a modified view that made exception
for certain "private misconduct by [P]residents" that could be defined
as "monstrous crimes."29  While not defining the constitutional
standard for "monstrous," Schlesinger knew that it included murder
and rape and, more importantly, excluded the charges against
President Clinton."
Conversely, the law professors (including Professor Pollitt) sent a
letter asserting an executive function theory with an express
exception.31 Unlike the historians, the law professors did not claim
"explicit" support for their interpretation in either the text or the
history of the Constitution.32 The law professors acknowledged that
"[n]either history nor legal definitions provide a precise list of high
crimes and misdemeanors. Reasonable people have differed in
interpreting these words. '33  Moreover, while arguing that
impeachable offenses are largely confined to abuse of office or official
misdeeds, the law professors expressly accepted that a president can
be impeached for "'private' conduct if it is deemed "heinous. '
Unfortunately, like Schlesinger's "monstrous" standard, the law
professors did not offer any basis for defining this conduct beyond
noting that murder is included and the crimes alleged against
President Clinton are excluded.35 Cognizant of the obvious questions
raised by such a new standard, Professor Cass Sunstein acknowledged
the lingering uncertainty as to the extension of this theory beyond this
case but advised Congress that we should "leave the hardest
questions raised hypothetically for another and better day."'36 Like
Justice Potter Stewart's test of pornography, impeachable offenses
would remain in that category of offenses that you presumably know
when you (or at least the academic signatories) see them.37
added).
29. Id. at 101 (prepared statement of Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).
30. See id.
31. See id at 375 (joint letter of the law professors). The law professors' letter was
signed by many of the academics at the impeachment hearings, including professors Susan
Bloch, Robert Drinan, Pollitt, Cass Sunstein, and Laurence Tribe. See id. at 376-83.
32 See i&i at 375.
33. Id.
34. Id. Various signatories to the law professors' letter presumably have abandoned
any claim that the language or history of the impeachment clauses categorically excludes
private acts and must be limited to uses of executive authority.
35. See id.
36. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 83 (testimony of Professor Cass Sunstein).
37. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall
not today attempt further to define ... [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could
1999] 1799
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This testimony leaves a mythological tale that appears
consciously crafted for one controversy. Both the historians and law
professors testifying in support of the executive function theory
asserted that impeachable offenses are restricted to official abuses or,
what Professor Schlesinger called, "political offenses against the
state."3 Yet, there are exceptions for types of private conduct that
meet an ill-defined standard of "monstrousness" or "heinousness."
Why? If impeachment is only designed to address public wrongs of
office, why is there any need to address wrongs linked to private
misconduct rather than leave such conduct to the criminal system?
The apparent answer is that some acts are so horrible that they
"acquire public significance."39 If this is the standard, however, some
criminal acts-like obstruction of justice-clearly would satisfy the
standard of "public significance" for many Americans. Ultimately,
what these historians and law professors present as a bright-line rule
deteriorates into a simple debate over the relative gravity of crimes or
misconduct.4°  The result is the archetype of mythologies-an
outcome-determinative theory that is best understood in the context
in which it is told.
Along this spectrum, Professor Pollitt's views fall closest to those
expressed in the historians' letter, both in their underlying historical
claims and in their contemporary conclusions. Professor Pollitt
signed the letter of law professors acknowledging that some
"'private'" conduct could result in impeachable offenses and noting
that the historical record was not clear on the meaning of "high
crimes and misdemeanors."'41 His testimony and his recent article,
however, advanced a more rigid view. In his congressional testimony,
Professor Pollitt asserted that, unlike the case against President
Richard Nixon, the Clinton impeachment was based on a flawed
understanding of the scope of impeachable offenses:
In contrast [to President Nixon], Clinton cheated on his
wife, lied about it; and did his best for six months to cover it
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.. .
38. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 101 (prepared statement of Professor Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr.).
39. Id. (prepared statement of Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.); see also Early
Edition, supra note 25 ("[T]he impeachment process was never meant to deal with
anything like perjury about a personal matter even before a grand jury... It was meant
to protect the nation and its [Clonstitution from attempts to subvert our system of
government and from gross corruption in office.").
40. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 272-75 (prepared statement of Professor
Turley); Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.B.).
41. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 375 (joint letter of the law professors).
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up. Certainly, as even he admits, not an honorable course of
conduct. Adultery, yes, possibly even perjury. But
impeachable offenses?
Not if we recall the Constitutional Convention where
our forefathers authorized impeachment when "great crimes
were committed against the state."
Not if we recall the Ratification Debates where
impeachable crimes were described as those "which may
with propriety be denominated POLITICAL."
Not unless we overlook consistent practice wherein the
Senate has refused to convict absent the clearest cases of
treason and bribery.
Where, as in the Nixon Impeachment, is there conduct
"subversive of constitutional government?"
Impeachment of President Clinton, simply put, would
turn two hundred years of constitutional history on end.42
In his recent article, Professor Pollitt argued that a review of past
impeachment cases supports the restriction of impeachable offenses
to exclude acts or crimes related to private conduct: "In this
tradition, the Senate follows the intent of those who framed our
Constitution that impeachment be used sparingly, and only 'when
great crimes were committed' and when there are 'attempts to
subvert the Constitution.' "I As support for this view in the Clinton
context, Professor Pollitt relied on his interpretation of sexual
misdeeds by prior office holders-including, as he discussed in his
congressional testimony, the Hamilton affair-as support for the
exclusion of such conduct from impeachment inquiries.'
Professor Pollitt made no suggestion in his testimony or writing
that the impeachment language allows for exceptions for private
conduct that can be deemed "heinous" or "monstrous." Like the
historians, he advanced a "bright-line rule" based on the executive
function theory. Moreover, in his article, Professor Pollitt appeared
42. 1d at 208 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt) (quoting statements attributed
to the Framers).
43. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 277 (quoting 2 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65, 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1934) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION] (statement of George Mason)).
44. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 204 (testimony of Professor Pollitt) ("[S]exual
impropriety is not an impeachable offense. We learned that very early on in the case of
Alexander Hamilton."). But see id. at 273 n.31 (prepared statement of Professor Turley)
(objecting to use of the Hamilton affair as "a sudden interest in the sexual habits of the
Framers, who are now being politically exhumed and 'spinned' as part of the crisis").
1999] 1801
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to approach judicial cases with the same limiting interpretation, a
variation best described as a "judicial function" theory.45  Any
critique of this argument must begin, as Professor Pollitt did, with the
Constitutional Convention and the Ratification debates.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES OF IMPEACHMENT AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
UNDER AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION THEORY
Professor Terry Eagleton once described ideology as "a kind of
contemporary mythology, a realm which has purged itself of
ambiguity. '46 While Professor Eagleton made this statement in the
context of literary theory, constitutional theory can often evidence
the same purging of ambiguity in reviewing a text. This process
appeared to run its course in the Clinton hearing and trial. While
many of the academics advancing an executive function theory signed
the letter to Congress acknowledging that the Framers did not clearly
establish the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the
academics who testified at the impeachment hearing claimed to have
found textual or historical evidence of such an intent. This evidence
provided the foundation for an outcome-determinative theory. It also
exhibited the modis operandi of mythology-making "even the most
historically contingent ideas seem universal, natural, and
inevitable.
47
To his credit, Professor Pollitt did not advance a textualist claim
to support the executive function theory. Moreover, Professor Pollitt
honestly noted that the Framers were divided at the Constitutional
Convention along a spectrum, with some individuals favoring
impeachment at will at one end and others opposing impeachment
under any circumstances at the other end.48 A compromise view
ultimately prevailed with the insertion of the familiar English
standard of "high crimes and misdemeanors." Nevertheless,
Professor Pollitt did assert that the record clearly evidenced an intent
45. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 268-77.
46. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 117 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the views
of French critic Roland Barthes).
47. Brown et al., supra note 5, at 458. Professor Robert Gordon once suggested that
we should review "mythic uses of the past" by lawyers not by demanding historical
accuracy, but instead by judging whether the uses constitute "'bad mythmaking.'"
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1055 (1981).
This standard appeared relevant in the historical accounts defending the executive
function theory.
48. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 262-64.
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to restrict the language under an executive function theory,4 9 a
position that I find unsupportable. Without repeating earlier
treatments of this historical record,5 a brief review of the sources
relied upon by Professor Pollitt and other academics to support this
claim of original intent is in order. As will become clear, I view the
record as incapable of mandating either a narrow or broad
interpretation under an intentionalist theory. Put another way, the
record on the Framers' intent is so sparse that it could be used to
support any of the rivaling theories with equal success. Ultimately,
such a record reinforces that myth "is an exercise in persuasion-true
rhetoric, but rhetoric nonetheless."'"
A. The Views of the Framers and Intentionalist Support for the
Executive Function Theory
Professor Pollitt advanced an intentionalist theory that he
contended is evidenced not only in the debates of the Framers but
also by past impeachment cases. He noted that the Senate has
"follow[ed] the intent of those who framed our Constitution" in
restricting impeachment to the exclusion of crimes related to personal
conduct:
52
In sum, the framers of the Constitution saw the need for an
Impeachment Clause "[w]hen great crimes were committed"
to reach "great and dangerous offences" and to protect
against "betray[all [of] trust to foreign powers," "[a]ttempts
to subvert the Constitution," and "treachery" and "other
high crimes and misdemeanors" against the state.53
Professor Pollitt took these limiting terms from statements made
by George Mason and James Madison. He also made use of
statements by Alexander Hamilton, who was perhaps the most
invoked (and ill-served) Framer in the House and Senate
proceedings. Throughout the Clinton impeachment debates,
academics appeared on Capitol Hill with such quotes in the same way
that crusaders once waved around bones of the saints.54 On closer
49. See id. at 265-67.
50. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 257-62 (prepared statement of Professor
Turley); Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Parts I.A. & II.A.);
Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part III.).
51. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 793 (referring to the "myth of judgment").
52. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 277.
53. Id. at 265 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at
65, 66, 550 (statements of James Madison and George Mason) (footnotes omitted)).
54. See Jonathan Turley, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1998,
at A23 [hereinafter High Crimes and Misdemeanors]; Jonathan Turley, The New
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inspection, however, these historical snippets prove to be less than
compelling evidence of an original intent supporting the executive
function theory.55
1. James Madison
Much has been made of Madison's role in resisting efforts to
have impeachment at will and, specifically, his objection to Mason's
suggested standard of "maladministration." '56 As noted by Professor
Pollitt, Madison objected that "maladministration" was too vague a
term for use as the constitutional standard for impeachment. 7
Advocates of the executive function theory repeatedly cited this
objection during the Judiciary Committee hearing to demonstrate
that Madison never would have accepted such a low standard for
removal and would have restricted impeachment to "great crimes." '58
While Professor Pollitt uses this exchange in a far more limited
fashion than did other academics, 59 Madison clearly did not indicate
such an intention. First, as for "maladministration," Madison only
objected to the use of the term in the language of the Constitution
and not to its use as the basis for removal. Quite to the contrary,
though never mentioned in the presentations to Congress, Madison in
fact endorsed the use of maladministration as a removal offense.
Originalists, LEGALTIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 27 [hereinafter New Originalists].
55. For example, one of the most oft-cited authorities to support the executive
function theory is James Wilson. In his 1791 Lecture on Law, Wilson stated that
"impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors,
and to political punishments." James Wilson, Lectures on Law (1791), in 2 THE WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON 166 (1804). When viewed in context, however, Wilson simply appears
to reaffirm distinguishing the American model from its historical predecessors.
Immediately following this observation, Wilson noted that impeachment is (unlike the
English model) restricted to political figures and that any non-political penalties are
barred under this system. See 2 id. Wilson may have supported any number of theories of
impeachment, but this source is hardly relevant, let alone supportive, of an executive
function theory.
56. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 550.
57. 2 Id.; Pollitt, supra note 11, at 265.
58. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 7, at 100 (testimony of Professor Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr.) (noting the Framers' emphasis on "great crimes" and "great and
dangerous offenses"); id. at 206-07 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt) (stressing
same references to show the Framers' intent).
59. See, e.g., Early Edition, supra note 25 ("James Madison thought that making all
cases of maladministration impeachable was just too vague.") (interview with Professor
Laurence Tribe); A Democratic Roundtable Discussion on the Impeachment Process, Oct.
15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 726546 (F.D.C.H.) (remarks of Professor Laurence Tribe)
("Madison, clearly one of the towering figures of our history, or of the world's history,
recognized that the power to remove a president for something as nebulous as
maladministration could lead to something to [sic] awfully close to Roger Sherman's idea
that you could remove a president at will.").
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Later, as a member of Congress, Madison treated the standard of
"high crimes and misdemeanors" as a requirement of good behavior
touching on a variety of official acts of negligence and nonfeasance. 0
Madison not only endorsed the maladministration standard as a basis
for impeachment but also gave examples of impeachable offenses,
including the offense of "wanton removal of meritorious officers."'"
Madison's view that "high crimes and misdemeanors" included
various forms of negligence is consistent with his earlier statement in
the constitutional debates that impeachment would be a protection
against "the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief
Magistrate." 62  That Madison's view of impeachment included
"maladministration" also is consistent with the failure to use the more
restrictive standard "high misdemeanors."63  Blackstone defined
"high misdemeanors" to include "mal-administration of such high
officers, as are in public trust and employment."'  Of course, this
evidence does not mean that Madison could not be construed as
viewing impeachment as largely connected to abuses of official
authority, but Madison is hardly support for the view of a "great
crime" standard for removal. Moreover, Madison's use of terms like
"perfidy" and "incapacity" could be viewed as support for a standard
extending beyond official acts to include conduct simply incompatible
with the status of the chief executive.
Professor Pollitt is correct that Madison referred to "betray[al]
[of] trust to foreign powers" in his discussion of impeachment in the
constitutional debates.65 This is one of Madison's most quoted
statements on the subject of impeachment. 66 It was not, however,
60. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA,
1635-1805, at 118-19 (1984).
61. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 498 (1789).
62. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 65.
63. The Framers were well-acquainted with the standard of "high misdemeanors" and
debated its incorporation as part of the standard for extradition. See 2 id. at 174. This
standard ultimately was rejected as too limited in meaning for the provision. In the
impeachment context, however, "high misdemeanor" repeatedly has been cited as the
basis for impeachment in various American cases. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 43
(1797) (describing the allegations against Sen. William Blount as a "high misdemeanor");
132 CONG. REC. 29,870-71 (1986) (incorporating a "high ... misdemeanor" article against
Judge Harry E. Claiborne). The House of Representatives specifically charged President
Andrew Johnson with violating the Tenure of Office Act, a violation deemed a "high
misdemeanor." See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
64. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121.
65. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 66; Pollitt, supra
note 11, at 264.
66. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 7, at 67 (prepared statement of Professor
Matthew Holden, Jr.); id. at 84 (prepared statement of Professor Cass Sunstein); 144
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part of any articulation of the standard for impeachment or even the
anticipated scope of impeachment. Rather, Madison was defending
the concept of impeachment. Madison made this statement in the
July 20, 1787, debate concerning the threshold question of whether a
president should be subject to impeachment under any conditions.67
When this quote is read in context, it is clear that Madison was
referring to the variety of misdeeds that a president of diminished
capacity or low integrity could produce:
Mr. <Madison>-thought it indispensable that some
provision should be made for defending the Community agst
the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate.
The limitation of the period of his service, was not a
sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a
scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers.8
The standard that Madison actually applies, if any, is "incapacity,
negligence, or perfidy." This standard is certainly not consistent with
a "great crimes" theory or an executive function theory. Betrayal of
trust to foreign powers is the type of conduct that Madison expected
from a president guilty of such things as "perfidy. '69 While the
Framers did refer to lying to Congress as an impeachable offense,70
there was never a suggestion that "betray[al]" of a foreign power was
intended to be a defining example of the scope of impeachment.
CONG. REc. S11,333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 2,1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
67. See 2 RECoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 65-66.
68. 2 Id. at 65.
69. Moreover, this passage was designed to show how essential it is to have a device to
guarantee that the Chief Executive is not incapable, negligent, or perfidious. Madison
continued:
The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the
Legislative or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It
could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an
Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray,
their trust. Besides the restraints of their personal integrity & honor, the
difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security to the
public. And if one or a few members only should be seduced, the soundness of
the remaining members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In
the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a single
man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable
events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
2 Id. at 66.
70. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 127 (photo. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1891) [hereinafter STATE CONVENTIONS] (statement of James Iredell) (noting in the
ratification debates that "giving false information to the Senate" is impeachable conduct).
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Madison's stated views are not consistent with a view of impeachable
offenses restricted to "great crimes." While it is certainly
understandable why scholars would enlist Madison's support to
advance a new theory, there is no basis for any claim that Madison's
statements clearly support a specific theory on the scope of
impeachable offenses.
2. George Mason
George Mason is also rightfully cited as a central figure in
shaping the language for the impeachment clauses. Mason's insertion
into the impeachment debate often centers on his objection to Roger
Sherman's proposal for impeachment by public demand in the
legislature.7' Mason opposed Sherman's proposal as diminishing the
authority of the chief executive in favor of the legislature.72 Mason,
however, clearly favored a standard far different from any "great
crime" standard, as indicated in his "maladministration" proposal.
There is no indication that Mason ever endorsed an executive
function theory. Rather, just as Madison believed that "high crimes
and misdemeanors" included maladministration, Mason's use of the
English standard as alternative language cannot be read as a vital
shift in his view of the basis for impeachment. Mason viewed
impeachment as a guarantee that mistakes in judgment by the
electorate could be corrected when warranted without waiting for the
next election. He noted that "[s]ome mode of displacing an unfit
magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who
choose, as Well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen."' Mason
71. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 85 (recording
that Roger Sherman of Connecticut "contended that the National Legislature should have
power to remove the Executive at pleasure"); see also 1 id. at 78 (recording that John
Dickenson of Delaware argued that the president should be "'removable by the national
legislature upon request by a majority of the legislatures of the individual States'"
(quoting Dickenson's proposal)). In the English system, the Parliament had the authority
to impeach "by address," which allowed the members to remove judges at its pleasure.
See 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
§ 2013, at 334-35 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS' PRECEDENTS]; see also 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 428-29 (chronicling various Framers' views
toward the English system of removal by address); Brendan C. Fox, Note, The
Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Trials, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1275, 1279-80 (1992) (noting that the Framers declined to adopt the
English practice of removal by address out of concern for the independence of the
judiciary). It is hard to believe that Mason was "shocked" by the Sherman proposal for
impeachment at will, Pollitt supra note 11, at 263, since it was a well-known view shared by
a number of delegates.
72. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 86.
73. lId.
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considered impeachment to be a critical mechanism in a system based
on equal application of the law and warned that "[n]o point is of more
importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued.
Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that man be above
it, who can commit the most extensive injustice?" 74
While it is true, as noted by Professor Pollitt, that Mason
referred to the use of impeachment "[w]hen great crimes were
committed,"'75 Mason did not make this statement during the critical
September 8, 1787, debate over the standard of impeachment.
Rather, these words were attributed to Mason during the July 20,
1787, debate over the very need for impeachment.7 1 Mason was
responding to Gouverneur Morris's suggestion that no impeachment
should be allowed with regard to the President. Morris insisted that a
president's "[c]oadjutors" could be punished, but the president's
punishment would come with the denial of his reelection.7 7 In
response, Mason noted the facial inequity in a hypothetical case
where "great crimes were committed" and the "[c]oadjutors" would
be punished but the president would not.78 Mason was not suggesting
a standard for impeachment; he was defending the need for
impeachment as a threshold matter by offering an extreme example
of where its omission would yield outrageous results. Thus, neither
Mason nor Madison listed great crimes exclusively in their view of
impeachable offenses. Mason cannot be cited as intentionalist
support for an executive function theory or any other theory. The
record does not provide Mason's clear intent on the scope of the
standard.
3. Alexander Hamilton
Professor Pollitt and other academics also rely on Alexander
Hamilton for the statement that impeachable offenses "are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to
the society itself."7 9 The misuse of this statement in the Clinton
impeachment and trial borders on the inspiring. Ironically, Hamilton
had little to do with the language of the final impeachment
74. 2 Id. at 65.
75. 2 Id.; Pollitt, supra note 11, at 264.
76. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 43, at 65.
77. 2 Id. at 64-65.
78. 2 Id. at 65.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 334 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed.
1987); Pollitt, supra note 11, at 266.
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provisions.80 Nevertheless, Hamilton's statement has been used to
suggest that impeachment votes should simply reflect the popularity
of the president; to endorse a vote of nullification by the House to
reject articles of impeachment even when supported; and finally, to
support the idea that impeachable offenses must be limited to
misconduct that produces "injuries done immediately to the society
itself."8' My disagreement is not with the suspicion that Hamilton
might support a restrictive view of impeachment; rather, my position
is that this statement has been taken out of context and Hamilton's
views are not clearly established in this reference or other writings.
The Hamilton quote appears not in the constitutional debates
but in his later contribution, The Federalist No. 65 2 Moreover, the
reference was to the Senate trial and not to the impeachment decision
in the House. Hamilton was discussing the value of using the Senate
for impeachment trials and why it is a superior option to using the
judiciary or other body. Hamilton saw the nature of the proceedings
as requiring a Senate trial:
The subjects [of Senate] jurisdiction [in an impeachment
trial] are those offences which proceed from the misconduct
of public men, or in other words, from the abuse or violation
of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom
fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to
divide it into parties, more or less friendly, or inimical, to the
accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the
other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest
danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.s3
Hamilton's reference to "injuries done immediately to the
society itself" appears in context to be part of an explanation of why
80. Gouverneur Morris, who served with Hamilton on the Committee of Style at the
constitutional convention, once wrote that, "General Hamilton had little share in forming
the Constitution. He disliked it, believing all Republican government to be radically
defective." Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Robert Walsh (Feb. 5, 1811), in 3
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 418.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 79, at 334 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. See id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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these trials will tend to be so partisan and emotional. In trying an
injury to itself, society will tend to convulse and test the tribunal,
particularly because a portion of the population will perceive a
president accused of impeachable offenses as having violated a sacred
public trust or convenant forged at the time of his election.
Accordingly, Hamilton asks: "What other body would be likely to
feel confidence enough in its own situation, to preserve unawed and
uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual
accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers."'
Hamilton proceeded to explain that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
be able to withstand such political pressures, "and it is still more to be
doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and
authority" needed to bring a final resolution to such a politically
charged trial 5  He viewed the underlying political dimension as
requiring that impeachment trials be placed outside the judicial
branch since impeachable offenses cannot be "tied down by ... strict
rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the prosecutors, or in
the construction of it by the judges. '86 Hamilton was not stating that
the offenses are "public" in the sense of official acts but that, when a
president commits high crimes and misdemeanors, the victim is the
public and the process of adjudication becomes part of the political
system in redressing that public injury.
Academics and others often invoke Hamilton's use of "public
injury" for a broader meaning as limiting the scope of impeachable
offenses. Yet, even taken as a substantive statement on the basis for
impeachment, Hamilton's inclusion of a "violation of some public
trust" and "misconduct" does not readily lend support to a "great
crimes" theory. Moreover, Hamilton appeared to view impeachment
as a process by which a president could be subject to prosecution for
any crime. Hamilton noted that when a president stands accused of
criminal acts, he can be impeached and "[hie may be afterwards tried
& punished in the ordinary course of law .... His impeachment shall
84. Id. at 335.
85. Id. Justice Story also noted that impeachment was left to Congress because courts
were poorly suited to deal with the great variety of grounds for which an official could be
removed ranging from slight guilt to major corruption: "What could be more
embarrassing, than for a court of law to pronounce for a removal upon the mere ground of
political usurpation, or malversation in office, admitting of endless varieties, from the
slightest guilt up to the most flagrant corruption?" 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITurION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 786, at 546 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1851).
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 79, at 335 (Alexander Hamilton).
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operate as a suspension from office until the determination thereof."'
This position would certainly not support the idea of impeachment
limited to official misconduct or abuses."8
The record of the Constitutional Convention and ratification
debates reflect that the Framers were faced with widely differing
views on impeachment and resolved the debate, not unlike modern
legislatures, by importing familiar and largely neutral language: This
result is evident from the process of drafting.
B. Intentionalist Support in the Constitutional Convention and
Ratification Debates
From the wide use of statements made during the constitutional
convention debates, one could conclude that the Framers did little
else than debate the meaning of impeachment. In reality, the entirety
of relevant statements could fit within a few pages of transcription
and the most used quotes actually appear on two pages of the record.
Impeachment was not a central concern of the debates, and the
divisions over its use did not present a significant conflict for the
Framers. Once again, this scant record leaves academics with the
common task of interpretation. 9 My conclusion is that no conclusion
87. Alexander Hamilton, Speech at the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787),
reprinted in 1 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWrH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A
DOCUMENTED HISTORY 97, 99 (1974).
88. This is not to suggest that there was no support among early commentators for a
restrictive view of impeachable offenses. William Rawle rejected the concept of
impeachment based on any grounds other than official acts. Rawle insisted that the intent
of the standard "can only have reference to public character and official duty." WILLIAM
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 215
(photo. reprint 1970) (2d ed. 1829). Rawle noted that "those offences which may be
committed equally by a private person as a public officer, are not the subjects of
impeachment." Id. Although supportive of a restrictive interpretation of impeachable
offenses, Rawle expressly rejected one of the principal elements of the position articulated
by Professor Pollitt and others in the joint letter of the law professors-the use of
impeachment in cases of "[m]urder, burglary, robbery, and indeed all offences not
immediately connected with office." Id. Thus, Rawle rejected the basis of the exception
of heinous or monstrous acts advanced in the Clinton crisis.
89. When Gouverneur Morris was asked in 1814 for a recollection of the intent
behind part of the Constitution, he remarked: "But, my dear Sir, what can a history of the
Constitution avail towards interpreting its provisions. This must be done by comparing
the plain import of the words, with the general tenor and object of the instrument." Letter
from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 419-20. Morris explained that his failure to
keep notes of the proceedings at the convention was due to the fact that "my mind was too
much occupied by the interests of our country to keep notes of what we had done." 3 Id.
at 419. He stated that he had "little recollection" of the discussions on the language of
particular parts of the Constitution. 3 1&
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is justified on this record alone.
The Framers heard widely different views on the use of
impeachment with standards ranging from "malpractice or neglect of
duty"90  to impeachment at the pleasure of Congress91  to
" 'maladministration' "92 to "Treason & bribery." 93  Eventually, the
decision to incorporate the known English standard appeared a
simple method of resolving the language but not necessarily the
meaning.94 The Framers did not indicate an intention of importing
the meaning of the English standard but rather accepted its language
as a compromise position.5 Whether the Framers' decision was the
result of a simple act of compromise or an Easterbrookian "deal"
96
remains shrouded in uncertainty. A problem arises only when
academics attempt to divine some supportive meaning in this process
or assume facts to deny support for rivaling theories. For example,
Professor Pollitt noted that the original language of the impeachment
clause ended with the words "against the State." 97 The presence of
such language would, of course, provide direct support for the
executive function theory. The Framers, however, struck this
language. Professor Pollitt, like other advocates of the executive
function theory, quickly noted that this language was stricken by the
Committee on Style and Arrangements, and because the Committee
"had no authority to alter the substance of what the Convention had
agreed upon,... the elimination can only mean that the Committee
90. 2 Id. at 64.
91. See 1 id. at 85; see also supra note 71 (discussing the English system of
impeachment by address).
92. 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 550 (quoting
Morris's proposal).
93. 2 Id.
94. The English standard does not support completely either a "great crime" theory
or an "executive function" theory. While impeachments primarily dealt with official acts,
the English model of impeachment included offenses that were neither "great" nor
"criminal" nor "official." See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at
Part ILA.). The English model also applied to any citizen and not just officials. See id.
95. See 2 REcoRDs OF THEi FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 550. Had
there been an interest in importing the meaning of the English model, one would have
expected some discussion as to its meaning in the debates. While there was passing
reference to the English impeachment of Governor General Warren Hastings, there was
no discussion of the translation of the English standard into the American system. This
would have created a number of significant issues given the use of the English model
against citizens, clergymen, and members of parliament. See id.
96. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 533, 537-40
(1983) (describing the prevalence of hidden legislative deals or compromises in statutory
language).
97. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 265.
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considered the words redundant, unnecessary surplusage.""g Rather
than undermine their theory, academics-like Professor Pollitt-
actually cite the elimination of these words as proof of the Framers'
intent to include the meaning of the executive function standard.
Once again, the point demands too much from the record. In reality,
although the Committee on Style and Arrangement did not have
authority to make substantive changes-it was empowered only "to
revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed
to' 99-the Committee apparently exceeded its authority to some
degree.10 While there certainly is room for speculation, there is no
basis to conclude that the Committee viewed the words "against the
states" as "redundant" or "unnecessary surplusage."''
98. Id.
99. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 553; see also
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 422 n.1 (1928) (noting that the
committee had "no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance). The
Supreme Court has relied expressly on this limitation on authority when interpreting the
text of the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 792
n.8 (1995); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 538-39 (1969).
100. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 213 (testimony of Professor Forrest
McDonald) ("We have heard several people comment that the Committee on Style would
not have taken liberties with the resolutions to the Convention. They don't understand
Gouverneur Morris, who ... took a number of liberties with the resolutions ... and when
he took too great a liberty, they checked him."). Changes made by the Committee on
Style would make significant alterations in the draft document. See, e.g., Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1780 (1996) ("In the
Committee of Style, Gouverneur Morris-in a last-minute move that passed without
debate and almost certainly without a great deal more general consideration-placed
ostensible limits on the clauses vesting legislative and judicial power but left the executive
Vesting Clause ostensibly open-ended."); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability:
An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1291-
92 (1998) (noting that the Committee on Style included "two ardent supporters of
nationalist fiscal policy-Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton" and, ultimately,
made "two important changes" in the Engagements Clause). Morris was accused of
attempted substantive changes, such as the accusation of Albert Gallatin that Morris used
his position on the Committee in an attempt "to throw thef words [in the general welfare
clause] into a distinct paragraph, so as to create not a limitation, but a distinct power." 3
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 379; see also FORREST
MCDONALD, NOvus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 264-65 (1985) (noting that Morris purposefully attempted to make the
General Welfare Clause a positive grant of power through the strategic placement of a
semi-colon); Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97
YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (discussing Max Farrand's account of this incident and
noting that, "[a]s punctuated by Morris, the clause might have implied an independent
power in Congress to pursue the general welfare, thus circumventing the gaps created by
the other enumerations of Article I"). But see David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the
Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215,253-54 (1995) (contesting the account).
101. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 265.
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Selected on September 8, 1787, the Committee on Style and
Arrangement was composed of five delegates: Alexander Hamilton,
William Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur
Morris." z Both Morris and King represented the original extreme
wing on impeachment, opposing any impeachment for the chief
executive. Morris played the most pronounced role in the four days
of refining the language of the Constitution and would later write that
he attempted to make subtle changes to his liking in the text." It is
possible that the language "against the states" appeared redundant
from Morris's perspective, but his perspective on this question was
hardly indicative of the general intent of the delegates. When the
words were missing four days later in the Committee's final draft, it is
possible that delegates took little notice or umbrage. The delegates
spent a hurried week of review and debate before their final vote of
approval on the draft submitted by the Committee."° It also is
possible that the Committee made this change for a substantive
purpose. It had made substantive changes in the past and may have
done so in this matter.05  Finally, in consultation with other
convention delegates, the Committee members may have viewed the
language "against the states" as controversial. Some delegates, such
as Roger Sherman, reportedly distrusted Morris and his role on the
Committee.0 6 These delegates may have been watchful on this issue
since Morris was part of the extreme opposite wing on the
impeachment question. It is possible that the restrictive language was
raised and Morris chose to omit it to eliminate potentially divisive
issues. 07 None of these possibilities can be excluded or proven on
this record. Thus, the suggestion that the language was necessarily
stricken as "redundant" falls dramatically short of providing textual
102. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 554.
103. In discussing language relating to the judiciary, Morris wrote that "it became
necessary to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor
shock their selflove." Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22,
1814), in 3 id. at 420.
104. The Committee on Style and Arrangement reported its draft to the delegates on
September 12, 1787, and the delegates voted to approve a final draft on September 17,
1787. See 2 id. at 590, 641.
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. One such issue was described by Albert Gallatin, who stated that Sherman was
outraged by changes made by Morris with regard to the General Welfare Clause to create
"a distinct power" not supported by the Committee of the Whole. See 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 379.
107. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 id.
at 419-20 (noting that, in addition to rejecting "redundant and equivocal terms," at times
"it became necessary to select phrases" so as to maintain support in the final vote).
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support for the executive function theory.
The ratification debates are even less helpful in judging any
originalist intent behind the impeachment standard. Professor Pollitt
cited as supportive of the executive function theory statements made
by James Iredell. Iredell is quoted as describing impeachment as
protecting against " 'tyranny and oppression' "I" and stating that
"'the only instances, in which the President would be liable to
impeachment, would be where he had received a bribe, or had acted
from some corrupt motive or other.' "109 In fact, it was Joseph Taylor,
not Iredell, who referred to "tyranny or oppression" in the context of
impeachment."0 Iredell did make the second attributed statement,
but his meaning appears quite different when placed into the context
of the North Carolina ratification debate. Iredell was responding to
an inquiry as to the relative responsibility of the Senate and the
president for a "bad treaty.""' The North Carolina delegates were
concerned that the Senate would ratify a bad treaty and then use the
treaty as the basis for an impeachment despite their own
responsibility. Thus, Iredell responded to an inquiry whether "it be
not inconsistent that [the senators] should punish the President,
whom they advised themselves to do what he is impeached for""' by
stating:
According to these principles, I suppose the only instances,
in which the President would be liable to impeachment,
would be where he had received a bribe, or had acted from
some corrupt motive or other. If the President had received
a bribe, without the privity or knowledge of the Senate, from
a foreign power, and, under the influence of that bribe, had
address enough with the Senate, by artifices and
misrepresentations, to seduce their consent to a pernicious
treaty,-if it appeared afterwards that this was the case,
would not that Senate be as competent to try him as any
108. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 266 (attributing statement to James Iredell).
109. Id. (quoting 4 STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 70, at 126 (statement of James
Iredell)).
110. 4 STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 70, at 33 (emphasis added) (statement of
Joseph Taylor). It is also worth noting that Taylor was not referring to any interpretation
of the impeachment standard in this reference. He was objecting to the notion of the
Senate as the sole trier of impeachments when the Senate members could well be part of a
"tyranny or oppression." 4 Id. Taylor objected that this would allow trial "[b]y a tribunal
consisting of the very men who assist in such tyranny.... None can impeach but the
representatives; and the impeachments are to be determined by the senators, who are one
of the branches of power which we dread under this Constitution." 4 Id.
111. 4 Id. at 125 (statement of Mr. Spencer).
112. 4 Id. (statement of Mr. Porter).
1999] 1815
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other persons whatsoever?"1
Iredell's reference to a "bribe" and lying to the Senate was
simply part of this hypothetical and was not a discussion of the scope
or meaning of impeachable offenses. Iredell was attempting to make
clear that a bad treaty is not a matter for impeachment so long as
there is not some added element such as a bribe; he was not
suggesting a limitation of impeachable offenses to official acts or
abuses.
Ironically, Iredell's comments on impeachment appear to weigh
heavily against the executive function theory or any notion of a
required "great crime." Iredell viewed impeachment as a necessary
response to a president "willfully abus[ing] his trust" and for such
offenses as "giving false information to the Senate.11 4 He made
additional general comments that would appear to support the use of
impeachment as a deterrent for presidents lacking the personal
integrity to comply fully with the laws:
I beg leave to observe that, when any man is impeached, it
must be for an error of the heart, and not of the head. God
forbid that a man, in any country in the world, should be
liable to be punished for want of judgment. This is not the
case here. As to errors of the heart, there is sufficient
responsibility. Should these be committed, there is a ready
way to bring him to punishment.... Were he punishable for
want of judgment, he would be continually in dread; but
when he knows that nothing but real guilt can disgrace him,
he may do his duty firmly, if he be an honest man; and if he
be not, a just fear of disgrace may, perhaps, as to the public,
have nearly the effect of an intrinsic principle of virtue.1
Iredell's comments are intriguing in the context of the Clinton
trial. In that case, House managers argued that the underlying
conduct was an error in moral judgment but not in itself impeachable.
When President Clinton lied under oath, 16 however, the affair
became an impeachable matter. In the same fashion, Iredell argued
113. 4 Id. at 126 (emphasis added) (statement of James Iredell).
114. 4 d. at 127.
115. 4 Id. at 125-26.
116. On April 12, 1999, Chief Judge Susan Webber Wright held President Clinton in
civil contempt for lying under oath and obstructing the court's proceedings. See Jones v.
Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 1999 WL 202909, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 12, 1999). The court
stated that it had "no doubt that the President violated this Court's discovery Orders
regarding disclosure of information deemed by this Court to be relevant to [the Paula
Jones] lawsuit." Id. This violation included "willful" and "intentionally false" testimony.
Id.; see also Jonathan Turley, What's Wrong with Wright, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1999, at
A23 (discussing the court's findings and their relevance to the Clinton impeachment).
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that, while some errors of judgment-such as making a bad treaty-
are not impeachable, the conduct becomes impeachable when an
additional criminal element is added or where a president lies to
Congress in the proceedings.
As in the Constitutional Convention, the impeachment standard
was not a significant issue in dispute in the state ratification debates.
After the Constitutional Convention, some commentators endorsed a
narrow view of the scope of impeachable offenses,"7 while others
insisted on a broader view."' The record simply does not answer the
contemporary question. Use of such a "legislative" record by
academics fulfills every nightmare of Justice Antonin Scalia. This is
not simply an act of using speeches given on the floor of Congress by
individual members to suggest an interpretative conclusion as to the
intent of the entire body. Rather, academics such as Professor Pollitt
have relied on statements made in debates unrelated to the
immediate issue under review-the standard of impeachment-to
suggest a general intent of the Framers. This is the very thing that
mythologies are made of: the placement of sporadic and seemingly
unrelated comments into a consistent mosaic. It is no longer an act of
interpretation but an allegorical tale that becomes "true history." 19
This creative mythological exercise is particularly evident in the
review of actual impeachment cases and their underlying meaning.
IV. THE LEGAL MYTHOLOGIES OF IMPEACHMENT AND THE
MEANING OF PAST IMPEACHMENT CASES
Mythology is powerful because it is built in part on known facts
or familiar images that are then formed into a single compelling
117. See, e.g., RAWLE, supra note 88, at 215.
118. Without expressing his own view, Justice Story described the broad view of
impeachment which was articulated during the first impeachment trial. Story noted that
"it was pressed with great earnestness, that there is not a syllable in the [Constitution,
which confines impeachments to official acts, and it is against the plainest dictates of
common sense, that such restraint should be imposed upon it." 1 STORY, supra note 85,
§ 804, at 559. Story posed a series of hypotheticals in support of such a theory:
Suppose a judge should countenance, or aid insurgents in a meditated conspiracy
or insurrection against the government.... Suppose a judge or other officer
[were] to receive a bribe not connected with his judicial office .... Would not
these reasons for his removal be just as strong, as if it were a case of an official
bribe?
1 Id.
119. MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REAL=TY 6 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1963) ("[Tjhe
myth is regarded as a sacred story, and hence a 'true history,' because it always deals with
realities.").
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story.121 In constitutional mythology, it is often necessary to tell a
story in the voice of a Framer or, alternatively, through the images of
past cases. The executive function theory is based on both accounts.
After presenting the theory in the voice of such Framers as Madison,
Hamilton, and Mason, advocates proceed to show that the theory was
passed down to successive Congresses which carried out the Framers'
intent. Thus, while only fully articulated in the Clinton crisis, this
theory in fact dictated the results of past impeachment cases-
presumably through a kind of constitutional oral history. Advocates
of the theory argue that past cases conform with the alleged view of
the Framers that officials, including judges, should be impeached only
for conduct related to official duties or abuses of authority.
121
Professor Pollitt's presentation of past impeachment cases
suffered from three failings. First, the specific cases can be
interpreted as refuting the theory advanced by Professor Pollitt.
Second, his review of cases relied on Senate trials to explore the
meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," when House
impeachments appear to provide the most relevant point of
comparison in determining the meaning of this standard.'12 Third,
Professor Pollitt's review was incomplete because he failed to
consider cases that were terminated before impeachment or a Senate
trial because of resignations or other reasons. Many inquiries have
been terminated due to resignations despite clear support for
impeachment in the House."2
120. This often requires that a figure or image or statement be magnified to downplay
rivaling figures or images or statements: "'[M]yth... is not an explatiation in satisfaction
of a scientific interest[;] ... it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief .... '" Id (quoting
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 19 (1926)).
121. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 112, 115 (testimony and prepared statement
of Professor Robert Drinan); id. at 207-08 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt); see
also Early Edition, supra note 25 (interview with Professor Laurence Tribe) (arguing that
past impeachment cases demonstrate that perjury concerning personal matters is not an
impeachable offense).
122. Academics often emphasize the Senate trials in exploring the meaning of this
phrase. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part III.B.).
The House, however, appears a more reliable point of comparison for determining the
meaning given impeachable, as opposed to removal, offenses. Senators can vote for
acquittal or conviction based on a variety of issues other than guilty, a point expressly
made by past Senators before their votes. In the Senate, impeachment is less of a
punishment than a remedy for misconduct in office. There may be circumstances where
the remedy of removal would aggravate rather than alleviate the injury from the view of
the Senate.
123. Although officials remain subject to impeachment following departure from
office, Congress has largely treated resignations as terminating impeachment proceedings.
See infra notes 231-65 and accompanying text. If the focus of a review of past
impeachment cases is a review of conduct considered impeachable in the House, these
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A. Judicial and Non-Presidential Impeachments
Professor Pollitt's review of past impeachment cases identifies a
pattern supporting the executive function theory advanced by himself
and others during the House impeachment hearing.124 Professor
Pollitt concludes (as have other academics) that these cases "follow[]
the intent of those who framed our Constitution" by limiting
impeachable offenses to acts of official abuse or violation of public
duties. 125 The individual case review offered by Professor Pollitt
contains interpretive differences in some but not all of the cases.
Given the significance of this record, each case warrants a brief
review.
1. William Blount (1798-99)
The impeachment of Senator William Blount of Tennessee may
have been the most interesting both factually and legally. 26 Factually,
Blount stood accused of a conspiracy with Great Britain to take over
territory in Florida and Louisiana (where Blount owned considerable
property). The conspiracy was revealed in a hand-written letter in
Blount's hand.' Despite the fact that the Senate had expelled
Blount from its membership, the senators believed that a former
officer could be impeached; however, the Senate did not believe that
a senator, or any legislative officer, was a "civil officer" for the
purposes of impeachment. Accordingly, the Senate dismissed the
case on jurisdictional grounds. 28 Notably, while clearly dismissing on
terminated cases expand the relatively limited evidence of congressional views of
impeachable conduct. As will be shown, the cases that continued to trial in the Senate
may not reflect the past view of impeachable offenses since a type of self-elimination
appears to have occurred in impeachment cases involving personal misconduct. When all
serious impeachment cases are considered, it appears that officials charged with personal
misconduct were significantly more likely to terminate proceedings through resignation
than officials charged with official abuses. See infra notes 231-65 and accompanying text.
124. With judicial officers, this theory is more appropriately denominated a "judicial
function theory." Two of the fifteen non-presidential impeachments involved executive,
as opposed to judicial, officers: William Blount and William Belknap. Congress, however,
has considered impeachment of other executive officers, such as the Consul-General and
Vice-Consul-General of Shanghai, see 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, §§ 2514-15,
at 1023-26, and the Consul of Dublin, see 3 id § 2502, at 1007.
125. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 277.
126. This case, and other impeachment cases, are discussed in Turley, Factional
Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.).
127. See id. (manuscript at Part IV.A.1.).
12& See id While Professor Pollitt indicates that these charges were "possibly"
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Pollitt, supra note 11, at 268, the record indicates that
jurisdictional grounds were clearly the basis of the decision. On this point, academics
appear fairly uniform. See, e.g., RAoUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
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the exclusion of legislative officers from impeachment procedures,'129
the Senate did not question seriously that the underlying conduct
would have been worthy of impeachment despite the fact that the
conduct was not viewed as violating any senatorial duty or criminal
law.130 Professors Hoffer and Hull note in their review of this case
that "Blount was not accused of any recognized crime or any
violation of the law. His misdemeanor was to mis-demean himself; to
misuse his office for his own speculative ends."'' Blount was never
charged criminally for any act connected to the conspiracy and he was
never accused of any misuse of his office.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 214-15 (1973); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal
Impeachment and Criminal Procedure: The Framers' Intent, 52 MD. L. REV. 437, 444 n.55
(1993).
129. The jurisdictional vote fell a few votes short of a majority for the inclusion of
senators under the rubric of "civil officers." The critical motion to that effect failed 11 to
14, with seven Federalists defecting to vote against jurisdiction. See BUCKNER F.
MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS AND THE
CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 231 (1998). This vote reflected a long-standing
view of many senators that legislative officers fall outside the impeachment process.
While the vote on the final motion was ambiguous as to the specific jurisdictional barrier,
see id. at 232, it is doubtful that it was due to Blount's resignation from the Senate as
opposed to his prior legislative status. Historically, impeachment was used against retired
officers. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Introduction)
(discussing the impeachment of Warren Hastings). This practice would be continued in
the United States in both the Blount and Belknap cases. The amenability of a legislative
officer (current or former) to impeachment was a primary focus of debate in the Blount
case. See MELTON, supra at 183-84.
130. Justice Story emphasized this issue in his celebrated lectures on the Constitution:
In the case of William Blount, the plea of the defendant... alleg[ed], that, at the
time of the impeachment, he, Blount, was not a senator, (though he was at the
time of the charges laid against him,) and that he was not charged by the articles
of impeachment with having committed any crime, or misdemeanor, in the
execution of any civil office held under the United States; nor with any
malconduct in a civil office, or abuse of any public trust in the execution thereof.
The decision, however, turned upon another point, viz., that a senator was not an
impeachable officer.
1 STORY, supra note 85, § 802, at 558 (footnote omitted).
131. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 153. In fairness to Professor Pollitt, some
individuals suggested at the time that Blount may have violated the Neutrality Act, Act of
June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381, 384 and Act of March 2, 1797, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 497
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994)). The articles against Blount referred to
"'violation of the obligation of neutrality, and against the laws of the United States.'"
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED
MATERIALS 126 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter SELECTED IMPEACHMENT
MATERIALS] (quoting the first article of impeachment); see also Turley, Factional
Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.A.1.) (discussing the Blount case). Yet, the
Senate trial did not emphasize such alleged criminal acts as opposed to the view that the
conduct was simply contemptible and outrageous for any public figure.
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2. John Pickering (1803-04)
Judge John Pickering has the ignoble distinction as the first judge
removed by the Senate. Professor Pollitt properly noted that
Pickering's impeachment occurred under extremely partisan
conditions in which Jeffersonians looked to impeachment as a way of
ridding the federal courts of Federalist appointees. 132 While there was
a sense of "payback time," as Professor Pollitt referred to it,33 a
review of impeachments of this period suggests defensible articles of
impeachment. This is not to deny a political motivation but rather to
acknowledge that the Jeffersonians selected their targets wisely.
Professor Pollitt noted that Pickering became controversial "when
continued drunkenness led to mental deterioration and erratic
behavior.""' 4 In fact, Pickering came to the federal bench in this
condition. Before his federal appointment, Pickering was the Chief
Justice of the New Hampshire courts until the state legislature sought
to remove him because of his mental instability and abusive
conduct. While Pickering was clearly unbalanced, the Federalists
saved him from state removal by placing him on the federal bench.
Notably, the basis for the impeachment included Pickering's personal
conduct as well as his judicial failings. Article Four of the Articles of
Impeachment addressed this legitimacy concern:
"That whereas for the due, faithful, and impartial
administration of justice, temperance and sobriety are
essential qualities in the character of a judge; yet the said
John Pickering, being a man of loose morals and
intemperate habits, on the 11th and 12th days of November,
in the year 1802, being then judge of the district court, in and
for the district of New Hampshire, did appear on the bench
of the said court, for the administration of justice, in a state
of total intoxication, produced by the free and intemperate
use of intoxicating liquors; and did then and there
frequently, in a most profane and indecent manner, invoke
the name of the Supreme Being, to the evil example of all
the good citizens of the United States; and was then and
there guilty of other high misdemeanors, disgraceful to his
own character as a judge, and degrading to the honor of the
132. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 268-71. See generally Lynn W. Turner, The
Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIsT. REV. 485 (1949) (discussing the facts of the
Pickering case).
133. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 269.
134. Id at 270.
135. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 207.
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United States." '136
Pickering's defenders actually argued a type of insanity defense.
Pickering's son, Jacob, raised this defense in a letter in which he
noted that, at the time of the specific instances of misconduct,137 his
father was "altogether incapable of transacting any kind of business
which requires the exercise of judgment, or the faculties of reason,
and therefore,... John Pickering is incapable of corruption or
judgement, no subject of impeachment, or amenable to any tribunal
for his actions.' 13 The final impeachment vote was along party lines
with Federalists supporting their appointee. This result was not
surprising since, at the time of his appointment, the Federalists were
presumably aware that the New Hampshire legislature, which had
impeached Pickering, considered him mentally unstable. While
partisan, Pickering's conviction was clearly well founded on objective
grounds.
3. Samuel Chase (1804-05)
The trial of Samuel Chase has received the most academic
attention of all of the past impeachments. Chase's is the only trial of
a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the trial occurred under
the same partisan conditions as the Pickering trial."3  The
Jeffersonians truly detested Chase-and not without cause. Chase
was partisan and abusive in his judicial conduct. 4° He used every
136. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 353 (1804) (quoting the fourth article of impeachment).
137. The most specific instance involved the case of United States v. The Brig Eliza, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 113 (1812), a confiscation case. In this case, Pickering simply-refused to
apply the Custom Duty Act of 1789 in favor of the United States. John Quincy Adams
and other Federalists insisted that Pickering was insane at the time and that such insanity
prevented him from defending himself as well as negated guilt. See ELEANORE
BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT
TRIALS 48-49 (1992); HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 213-15.
138. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 214.
139. The House actually approved an impeachment inquiry into the conduct of an
unnamed Supreme Court Justice in 1868 on the basis of a newspaper article which
reported:
"At a private gathering of gentlemen of both political parties, one of the justices
of the Supreme Court spoke very freely concerning the reconstruction measures
of Congress, and declared in the most positive terms that all these laws were
unconstitutional, and that the court would be sure to pronounce them so. Some
of his friends near him suggested that it was quite indiscreet to speak so
positively, when he at once repeated the views in a more emphatic manner."
3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, § 2503, at 1008 (quoting an article appearing in the
EVENING EXPRESS (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 29, 1868). The House voted 97 to 57 in favor
of an impeachment inquiry, in what may be the only anonymous impeachment inquiry in
history. See 3 id.
140. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 229.
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degree of his judicial authority to pursue or retaliate against critics of
the Federalists, including the abusive use of grand juries against
journalists.14' His articles of impeachment included pursuit of a
journalist named James Callender on criminal charges after Callender
criticized President Adams and the Federalists, grand jury abuses,
and conduct "highly disgraceful to the character of a judge."142
Professor Pollitt concluded that the Senate acquitted Chase because
of its acceptance of the "theory that an official was impeachable only
if he committed a criminal act."'143 The record, however, does not
support such a conclusion. First, it is unlikely that the same senators
who removed Pickering for non-criminal offenses would suddenly
adopt the inverse threshold determination. In their extraordinary
study of early American impeachments, professors Hoffer and Hull
specifically rejected the notion that the Chase acquittal established
any precedent for "limit[ing] impeachable offenses to crimes [since]
[t]hat had never been the boundary of impeachment in America."'"
Second, Professor Pollitt is simply mistaken in his view that these
Pickering and Chase cases were "almost identical."'145 Pickering was
largely, if not completely, insane. Moreover, other differences in
Chase's case have been credited with swaying the handful of
Republican defectors. Before the Senate, Chase appeared to accept
some responsibility and "[h]is contribution to the winning of
independence, added to the humiliation of the impeachment, might
have seemed arguments against his removal.' 46  Chase also was
assisted by a prosecution that some senators viewed as over-bearing
and self-defeating.147
A critical distinction is that the House impeached Pickering
largely because of his personal conduct on the bench and mental
instability. Chase was also abusive on the bench, but he had
demonstrated the inclination to moderate this conduct. 14  Moreover,
in his open partisanship, Chase was not entirely at odds with the
standard of the period. While the Chase trial represented an early
141. See id.
142. Id. at 236.
143. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 271.
144. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 255.
145. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 271 n.99.
146. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 253 ("Undoubtedly a destitute, infirm, and
bowed Chase was a more sympathetic figure than a Chase in full cry on the bench.").
147. See id. ("According to John Quincy Adams, [House manager] Randolph had
alienated many Republican senators by his bluster and incompetence. Coke told Adams
that Randolph cost the cause votes (though not [Coke's]).").
148. See id.
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debate of judicial ethics and professionalism, judges were still
composed of individuals with little legal training or temperament by
modem standards and with varying views on judicial neutrality.
149
Yet, if a modem judge were to engage in such open partisan conduct
and grand jury abuses, it is unlikely that Congress would be reluctant
or slow to act. Chase's acquittal-secured despite majority votes on
three articles-does not provide evidence supporting Professor
Pollitt's assertion that "the Senate accepted the theory that an official
was impeachable only if he committed a criminal act."15
4. James H. Peck (1826-31)
Judge James Peck of the District Court of Missouri represented
the lingering presence of judges on the federal bench with highly
personal views of judicial authority. Peck did not hesitate to use such
authority to punish his critics. Such was the case when an attorney
named Luke Lawless wrote an anonymous letter to a newspaper
responding to an opinion authored by Peck. Peck had published the
opinion in another newspaper explaining his decision in a case in
which Lawless was counsel.' Lawless's letter was quite mild on the
surface152 and put forward an account of the case intended to show
that "' "the judge's recollection of the argument of the counsel for
the petitioner, as delivered at the bar, differs materially from what I
can remember." ' "53 Signed "A Citizen," it did not take much
imagination to guess the identity of the letter's author. Peck ordered
the arrest and incarceration of Lawless and ordered that the attorney
be suspended from practice before the court.
149. Even one of Chase's supporters described Chase as "'guilty of intemperate
feelings and language, and of imprudence not becoming the character of a judge.'"
BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 58 (quoting Sen. William Plumer, a Federalist from New
Hampshire); see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 254 ("Although Chase was
something of a throwback in his view of the judiciary, he was not unique in his manners.").
Judge John Pickering is another case in point. Even though Pickering served as a state
attorney general, Chief Judge of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and a federal
district court judge, his formal training at Harvard was for the ministry, not the law. See
id. at 207.
150. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 271.
151. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 137-38
(incorporating the article of impeachment).
152. There is some basis to suggest that Judge Peck's anger was understandable while
his actions were clearly improper. It has been noted that "[t]his 'concise statement' was as
unfair as can be imagined.... Its effect was of a reductio ad absurdum of Judge Peck's
opinion." Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the United
States, 28 COLuM. L. REv. 401,428 (1928) (quoting Lawless's letter).
153. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 138 (quoting the
article of impeachment (quoting Lawless's letter)).
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Represented by Daniel Webster, Peck put on an aggressive
defense before the Senate in the face of accusations that he acted "to
the great disparagement of public justice, the abuse of judicial
authority, and to the subversion of the liberties of the people of the
United States."'" Peck was acquitted by a vote of twenty-one for
conviction to twenty-two for acquittal. 5 Professor Pollitt concluded
that "the Senate voted not to convict because criminal intent had
neither been charged nor proved.' ' 56 Once again, Professor Pollitt's
analysis appears to be an example of "abolishing complexities and
creating a 'blissful clarity.' ",'57 As with Chase, the historical record
does not support such a conclusion. Contemporary legal accounts
isolate a more complex legal issue-the proper use of contempt.'
Peck's impeachment was framed as a question of whether his
"[t]yrannous treatment of counsel" deprived him of fitness to serve.
159
Before the Peck trial, there was considerable disagreement as to the
power of contempt and its use. 6 Peck relied heavily on this
controversy to argue that, if he, had erred, he did so "in company with
judicial characters with whom any judge may be proud to
associate."' 6 Peck argued that his action was needed given thirty-
seven pending claims, including cases in which Lawless was counsel.
With some support from later disinterested reviewers, Peck insisted
that he concluded that Lawless's article "could have no end except to
subject the court to contumely and promote sympathy with the land
claimants, making fair juries unobtainable in their cases."'62 Thus, the
Senate was primarily divided on whether Peck's act was clearly an
abuse of power under contemporary standards, not on the need for
alleged or proven acts of criminality. The day after the acquittal,
154. Id. (quoting the article of impeachment).
155. See BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 111 (providing composite portraits of senators
voting for or against conviction).
156. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 271-72.
157. See Brown et al., supra note 5, at 457.
158. See BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 113 ("Judge Peck's trial is valuable for its
lengthy review of contempt and for bringing about an act of Congress that remains in
force."); Nelles & King, supra note 152, at 430 ("Clear as it was that if Judge Peck had
erred, he had erred 'in company with judicial characters with whom any judge may be
proud to associate,' the result was close.") (footnote omitted) (quoting Peck's defense
counsel, William Wirt).
159. JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND
OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 240 (1962).
160. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1034 n.32 (1993).
161. ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 45 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray and Co. 1833).
162. Nelles & King, supra note 152, at 428.
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Congress immediately moved to resolve the legal ambiguity with a
formal statute on contempt.63 There is no indication that the
majority of senators doubted that the conduct was abusive or that
non-criminal conduct could lead to removal. It is more likely that the
legal basis for Peck's actions was sufficiently controversial to convince
a simple majority of senators to vote in favor of acquittal.
5. West H. Humphreys (1862)
Judge West Humphreys was one of a number of federal judges
caught in the division of the Civil War. A judge on the District Court
of Tennessee, Humphreys actively supported the Confederacy,
advocated succession, and immediately converted his court into the
" 'district court of the Confederate States of America.' "164 In this
capacity, he ordered the arrest of Perez Dickinson, placed him under
bond until he swore allegiance to the Confederacy, and further
ordered the confiscation of property of various citizens. 165 The
impeachment and conviction of Humphreys is perhaps the most
defensible and understandable decision by the Senate in any
impeachment cases. Whatever interpretation of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" is adopted, the use of official authority in support of a
successionist government should suffice as impeachable conduct for
any academic.
6. Mark H. Delahay (1872)
The impeachment of Judge Mark H. Delahay of the District
Court of Kansas is not included in Professor Pollitt's review and is
often left out of academic studies of impeachment because, while
impeached, Delahay resigned shortly before his Senate trial.
163. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1027 (1924). The Peck case did not simply prompt action on the
federal level: "So deeply did the Peck case stir the country that State after State copied
the new Federal law." Id
The relationship between judicial scandal and legal reform is well established. See,
e.g., George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications
of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence
During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 291, 313 (1998) (discussing
the significance of the 1921 case of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis of the Northern
District of Illinois, who accepted a salaried position as National Commissioner of Baseball
while remaining on the bench, to the development of judicial conflicts rules).
164. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 141 (quoting the sixth
article of impeachment against Judge Humphreys).
165. The seized property included that of future President (and impeachment
defendant) Andrew Johnson. See id.
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Nevertheless, Delahay is one of the few judges the House has found
to have committed "high crimes and misdemeanors." Delahay was
accused of being of low character'66 and commonly " 'intoxicated off
the bench as well as on the bench.' "167 This conduct appeared to
include, but was not limited to, official misconduct such as
"sentenc[ing] prisoners when intoxicated, to the great detriment of
judicial dignity."' 68 The House Judiciary Committee reported that
"'there is enough in his personal habits to found a charge upon, and
that is all there is in this resolution.' "169 Upon this basis alone, "[t]he
resolution of impeachment was ... agreed to without division."'7 ° On
March 3, 1872, the House managers met with the Senate, which
notified the House that" '[t]he Senate [was] ready to receive articles
of impeachment against Mark H. Delahay.' "11 Delahay resigned,
however, before the Senate trial commenced. 72
7. William W. Belknap (1876)
The impeachment of former Secretary of War William Belknap
represents a critical case in the congressional view of the scope and
meaning of impeachment. Since Belknap was no longer in office at
the time of his trial, the Belknap case indicates that resignation from
office does not prevent trial on articles of impeachment. In this case,
there was no need to impeach to protect the public from any
additional harm or to assure the proper functioning of government.
There was no "threat" to the system in keeping an official in office, as
advocates of the executive function theory often emphasize. Instead,
the House impeached and the Senate tried Belknap as a political
response to a political injury, a corrective measure that helped the
system regain legitimacy.73
Belknap was charged with accepting bribes for contracts
associated with the Indian territory. 74 The House managers charged
166. See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, § 2504, at 1008.
167. 3 Id. § 2505, at 1009 (quoting Rep. Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts, a
member of the House Judiciary Committee).
168. 3 Id
169. 3 Id- at 1010 (quoting Rep. Butler).
170. 3 Id.
171. 3 Id. (quoting message of the Senate to the House).
172. See Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
957 n.22 (1995); Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal
Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992,142 U. PA. L. REV. 333,336 n.14 (1993).
173. For a full discussion of this particular role of the Senate trial and, specifically, the
Belknap case, see Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.A.2.).
174. These bribes included a $6000 per year payment and $1500 for other
appointments. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 145-47;
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that Belknap had " 'disregard[ed] his duty as Secretary of War, and
basely prostitut[ed] his high office to his lust for private gain.' ,175
Belknap first raised the jurisdictional argument that impeachment did
not extend to former or retired "civil officers." The Senate voted on
this threshold jurisdictional question and reaffirmed that it had
jurisdiction over former officers by a vote of thirty-seven to twenty-
nine.176 Professor Pollitt correctly noted, however, that many senators
continued to question jurisdiction and apparently voted for acquittal
on this basis. 77 There was little question of guilt, especially in light of
the fact that Belknap refused to answer the articles of
impeachment. 78 Ultimately, only three senators believed Belknap
was innocent, but twenty-two senators had doubts on the
jurisdictional issue.179 The final vote on the closest article was thirty-
seven to twenty-five in favor of impeachment. 8 This vote, however,
was only four votes short of the number needed for conviction.181
Since only three senators cast their votes based on lingering doubts of
guilt on the merits, Belknap's acquittal can be attributed to one
senator who questioned jurisdiction.
8. Charles Swayne (1903-05)
The impeachment of Judge Charles Swayne was the most
partisan twentieth century case. Swayne was charged with a variety
IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT TRIALS AND ERRORS 155 (1972).
175. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 49-50 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS] (quoting the third article of impeachment).
176. House managers have since reaffirmed the position that resignations do not
necessarily terminate impeachment proceedings. In the case of Judge George English,
House managers accepted English's resignation during his Senate trial; however, the
managers stressed for the record that "'[we] are of the opinion that the resignation of
Judge English in no way affects the right of the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment,
to hear and determine said impeachment charges."' 6 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON'S
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 547, at 785 (1935) [hereinafter
CANNON'S PRECEDENTS] (quoting report of the House managers); see also Turley,
Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.B.) (discussing the English case).
177. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 272.
178. See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 37 (1970).
179. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 52 (1996). Only one senator failed to
give his reason for voting against conviction. See BRANT, supra note 174, at 160.
180. There were majority votes in favor of conviction on all five articles, ranging from
35 to 37. See 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, § 2467, at 945.
181. With 62 voting senators, the House managers needed 41 votes for conviction. The
22 senators voting for acquittal on jurisdictional grounds proved just enough for Belknap
to avoid conviction.
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of offenses ranging from residency violations to corruption to simple
incompetence. 182 Florida Democrats despised Swayne and asked for
the initiation of impeachment proceedings.183 House and Senate
Democrats were perfectly happy to take up the case against
Swayne 4 The Swayne trial involved one of the most thorough
reviews of the Framers' intent as well as English and American
cases.185 Swayne advanced an originalist argument that none of these
allegations rose to the level of impeachable offenses. He insisted that
the Framers intended the standard of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" to be limited to proven criminal acts and that the
allegations against him involved lesser offenses which fell short of
"any misdeeds meeting historical or constitutional descriptions of
impeachable conduct.' 1 6  The House managers expressly opposed
this restrictive view of the scope of impeachable offenses:
"[The contention is that] however serious the crime, the
misdemeanor, or misbehavior of the judge may be, if it can
be said to be extrajudicial, he cannot be impeached. To
illustrate this contention, the judge may have committed
murder or burglary and be confined under a sentence in a
penitentiary for any period of time, however long, but
because he has not committed the murder or burglary in his
capacity as judge he cannot be impeached. That contention,
carried out logically, might lead to the very defeat of the
performance of the function confided to the judicial branch
of the government."'"
Both the House and a majority of the Senate rejected Swayne's
argument. Ultimately, however, Swayne prevailed in a partisan final
182. See 3 id. § 2469, at 949.
183. See 3 id. § 2469, at 948-49; BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 192 (quoting another
judge as describing Swayne as" 'persona non grata with the Democrats in Florida' ").
184. One of the most interesting aspects of the Swayne case was that the House of
Representative voted twice to impeach Swayne. After the first impeachment, the House
again took up the case but, after further debate, the second decision to impeach was closer
than the first. See BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 193 (noting that, in comparison to its first
decision to impeach by a vote of 198 to 61, on the second occasion the House voted 165 to
160 in favor of impeachment for filing false expense accounts, 162 to 138 for impeachment
for improper use of a private railroad car, 159 to 136 in favor of impeachment for living
outside his judicial district, and, without voting, "also agreed ... to impeach Swayne for
imposing unlawful sentences for contempt of court").
185. See id. at 201.
186. Id.
187. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105th CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: MODERN PRECEDENTS 7 (Comm. Print
1998) [hereinafter MODERN PRECEDENTS] (quoting statement of Rep. Clayton during the
Swayne case).
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vote. The thirty-four day Senate trial ended in acquittal with the
majority of Republicans voting to acquit and the majority of
Democrats voting to convict.
9. Robert W. Archbald (1912-13)
The case against Judge Robert Archbald of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit contained charges similar to those
against Judge Swayne only ten years before.' Most of the conduct
detailed by the House of Representatives occurred while Archbald
was a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Archbald was serving a four-year appointment to sit
by designation on the U.S. Commerce Court with responsibility over
the Interstate Commerce Commission and railroads. Like Swayne,
Archbald was charged with a variety of misdeeds ranging from
corrupt influence over litigants to acceptance of free trips from a
railroad. Unfortunately for Archbald, however, the political
environmental had changed. In a non-partisan vote, Archbald was
convicted and removed from judicial office. The Archbald case was
built squarely on judicial misconduct in the acceptance of loans from
individuals appearing before his court and using his position to obtain
coal leases.189
During the debate over impeachment, Archbald argued that
some of the allegations concerned actions he took as a citizen and
were not any abuse of a judicial function. The House Judiciary
Committee rejected this argument, citing Judge West Humphreys's
case for precedent: "'The evidence clearly showed that [Humphreys]
was in no wise acting in a judicial capacity, yet he was convicted
"190 While Archbald's articles of impeachment in fact did focus
on judicial improprieties, the Judiciary Committee expressly rejected
a judicial function theory which would confine impeachment to
conduct related to the misuse of office or authority:
"Any conduct on the part of a judge which reflects on his
integrity as a man or his fitness to perform the judicial
18& For a detailed account of the facts of the Archbald case, see BUSHNELL, supra
note 137, at 217-42.
189. See BORKIN, supra note 159, at 221. The article of impeachment receiving the
greatest support in the Senate alleged that Archbald and a partner purchased a culm dump
from Erie Railroad while the railroad was a litigant before him. See BUSHNELL, supra
note 137, at 221.
190. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 174 (quoting the
House Judiciary Committee report). Importantly, the House did not view such a nexus as
critical; however, since Humphreys was acting as a judge for a rebel nation, the choice of
historical examples was questionable.
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functions should be sufficient to sustain his impeachment. It
would be both absurd and monstrous to hold that an
impeachable offense must needs be [sic] committed in an
official capacity. If such an atrocious doctrine should
receive the sanction of the congressional authority, there is
no limit to the variety and the viciousness of the offenses
which a Federal judge might commit with perfect immunity
from effective impeachment." 191
In the Archbald case, the House managers stressed the right to
remove a judge who "degraded his high office and has destroyed the
confidence of the public in his judicial integrity."'" Archbald's
conviction was almost unanimous, with only five votes to acquit out of
seventy senators, who were divided almost equally between the
parties.
10. George W. English (1926)
Professor Pollitt also omits the case of Judge George W. English
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Illinois in his case-by-case
review of impeached judges. Like Judge Delahay, Judge English
should be included in the list of impeached officials, though he was
not tried to verdict. English was charged with favoritism and
improper loan arrangements and other personal transactions with
parties before his court. By an overwhelming vote of 306 to 62, the
House impeached English on April 1, 1926.193 What is most
interesting about the English case was the standard for impeachment
articulated by the House Judiciary Committee:
"Although frequently debated, and the negative advocated
by some high authorities, it is now, we believe, considered
that impeachment is not confined alone to acts which are
forbidden by the Constitution or Federal statutes. The
better sustained and modem view is that the provision for
impeachment in the Constitution applies not only to high
crimes and misdemeanors as those words were understood
at common law but also acts which are not defined as
criminal and made subject to indictment, but also to those
which affect the public welfare. Thus an official may be
impeached for offenses of a political character and for gross
betrayal of public interests. Also, for abuses or betrayal of
191. L (quoting the House Judiciary Committee report).
192. 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE TRIAL AND IMPEACHMENT OF ROBERT W. ARCHBALD, S.
DOC. No. 62-1140, at 1682 (1913).
193. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 545, at 779-80.
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trusts, for inexcusable negligence of duty, for the tyrannical
abuse of power, or, as one writer puts it, for a 'breach of
official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, including
conduct such as drunkenness when habitual, or in the
performance of... an official function, which tends to bring
the office into disrepute, or for an abuse or reckless exercise
of discretionary power as well as the breach of an official
duty imposed by statute or common law.' "94
The trial was commenced on April 22, 1926.195 On November 10,
1926, a letter from Judge English to President Calvin Coolidge
extending English's resignation was read to the Senate.196 On
December 11, 1926, the House (with twenty-three votes in
opposition) asked the Senate to proceed no further with the matter
given Judge English's resignation.197 On December 13, 1926, the
Senate agreed (with nine votes in opposition) to drop any further
proceedings with regard to the former judge. 98
11. Harold L. Louderback (1932-33)
Judge Harold Louderback of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California was impeached on five articles
alleging "tyranny and oppression, favoritism and conspiracy, whereby
he has brought the administration of justice in said district in the
court of which he is a judge into disrepute, and by his conduct is guilty
of misbehavior."'199 The specific charges included a residency charge
(similar to the charges against Judge Swayne),20 "partiality and
favoritism" in cases,21' and the improper appointment of bankruptcy
receivers .2 1 The Louderback case reflected a trend of the House in
investigating or impeaching officials for any conduct-official or
unofficial-viewed as bringing an office "into disrepute" or raising
194. 6 IM § 545, at 779-80 (quoting report of the House Judiciary Committee)
(emphasis added).
195. See 6 id. § 546, at 781.
196. See 6 id § 547, at 784 (incorporating the November 4, 1926, letter from Judge
English to President Coolidge, which read in part, "I have come to the conclusion on
account of the impeachment proceedings instituted against me, regardless of the final
result thereof, that my usefulness as a judge has been seriously impaired").
197. See 6 id. § 547, at 785.
198. See 6 id.
199. SELECrED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 184-85 (quoting the
first article of impeachment against Judge Louderback).
200. See id. at 185 (first article of impeachment).
201. Id. (quoting the second article of impeachment).
202- See id. (fifth article of impeachment).
[Vol. 771832
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES 1833
compelling questions of legitimacy. 3 Lasting seventy-six days, the
case against Louderback was presented with considerable detail, as
was the case for the defense.2° In a bipartisan decision, the Senate
found the charges against Louderback to be wanting and acquitted
him by a wide margin. 5
12. Halsted L. Ritter (1936)
The House impeached Judge Halsted L. Ritter of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on charges ranging
from favoritism to kickbacks to income tax evasion.0 6 Some of the
charges presented rather circuitous routes of enrichment such as
favoritism to a receiver who proceeded to appoint Mrs. G.M.
Wickard, Ritter's sister-in-law, "'who had had no previous hotel-
management experience, to be manager of the Julia Tuttle Hotel and
Apartment Building.' ,207 Such evidence was controversial in both
houses as the basis for removal of a federal judge.20 8 Ritter's case
would contradict one of the principle arguments used in the Clinton
case against the articles of impeachment: the suggested invalidity of
203. Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.B.).
204. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF
IMPEACHMENT OF HAROLD LOUDERBACK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, S. Doc. No. 73-73 (1933).
205. The House managers were only able to secure a majority on one article. See
BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 263. The strongest article proved to be the final article,
which as amended alleged that Louderback's actions " 'create[d] a general condition of
widespread fear and distrust and disbelief in the fairness and disinterestedness'" of his
rulings and that the "'general and aggregate result'" was to destroy confidence in the
court. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, supra note 175, at 55 (quoting the fifth article of
impeachment). The article concluded that "'for a Federal judge to destroy [such
confidence] is a crime and misdemeanor of the highest order.'" Id. (same).
206. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 198-202.
207. Id at 201 (quoting the seventh article of impeachment).
208. Ritter's case followed a curious path reminiscent of the double impeachment of
Judge Swayne. After its first inquiry into the case, the House Judiciary Committee
resolved not to impeach. The House, however, returned to the impeachment question and
ultimately voted to impeach, despite the fact that almost three years had passed since the
investigation had begun. See BUSHNELL, supra note 137, at 270. Judge Ritter later
challenged his impeachment, but the Court of Federal Claims held that the suit was non-
justiciable. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 296-300 (1936). Ritter was not
unique in the reconsideration of impeachment. Judge John Watrous of the District of
Texas was subject to a House vote of impeachment in 1858 but the House rejected articles
of impeachment. In fact, due in part to the encouragement of Senator Sam Houston, the
House voted four times to secure votes for impeachment but failed each time. See Van
Tassel, supra note 172, at 377 (discussing case). See generally WALLACE HAWKINS, THE
CASE OF JOHN C. WATROUS, UNITED STATES JUDGE FOR TEXAS: A POLITICAL STORY
OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (1950) (providing a detailed history of these
events).
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an article of impeachment that contained multiple grounds for
impeachment.0 9 The Senate acquitted Ritter on all articles of
impeachment except the final article, which was an omnibus charge
containing the allegations of the prior rejected articles.210 Not only
did the final article support the future use of general articles, but it
included impeachable acts, such as tax evasion, which were unrelated
to any judicial function.
13. Harry E. Claiborne (1986)
After a fifty-year hiatus of impeachment activity, in 1986 the
House voted to impeach and the Senate voted to convict Judge Harry
Claiborne of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.
2 11
Professor Pollitt described Claiborne as a judge convicted in federal
court of "tax evasion-he neglected to report some bribes." ' 2 Based
on this understanding of the case, Professor Pollitt included Claiborne
in a list of judges removed from office "for accepting bribes or lying
about accepting bribes-all various forms of bribery. 2 13 Claiborne,
however, was never convicted in court of bribery or tax evasion
related to bribes, but simply tax evasion. The point is not as minor as
it may appear since it has considerable relevance to the definition of
impeachable offenses. It is true that there was at one time a bribery
charge pending against Claiborne in the criminal trial. Claiborne was
originally tried on four counts, including one count of bribery, "two
counts of tax evasion unrelated to the alleged bribes, and one count
of filing a false financial statement with a Judicial Ethics
Committee." '214 After the jury failed to reach a verdict in the first
trial,21 5 the bribery charge was dropped in favor of the charges of tax
evasion and filing of a false financial statement. Claiborne was re-
tried and a jury convicted him on tax evasion charges unrelated to
bribery.
216
209. See 145 CONG. REc. S63 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (quoting President Clinton's
affirmative defense that "Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges multiple
instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which makes it impossible for the
Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandates that any conviction be by the
concurrence of the two-thirds of the members").
210. See 80 CONG. REC. 3066-92 (1936).
211. See S. Doc- No. 99-48, at 11 (1986).
212. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 275.
213. Id- at 276-77.
214. See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt,
C.J., dissenting).
215. In his first trial, Claiborne was not convicted due to a hung jury. See id. at 1327
(Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting).
216. See United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989). The House
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As part of his defense before the Senate, Judge Claiborne
advanced the same basic theory as executive function advocates.
Claiborne's defense counsel insisted that the articles of impeachment
were facially invalid because " 'there is no allegation ... that the
behavior of Judge Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in
his official function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.' ,,2I7 The
House managers vigorously opposed this position,218 and the Senate,
through its vote to convict, reaffirmed House Manager Hamilton
Fish's basic argument: "Impeachable conduct does not have to occur
in the course of the performance of an officer's official duties.
Evidence of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors
can be justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise
of public office."
'219
The Claiborne case is obvious precedent to refute an executive
function theory or judicial function theory.' 2 Claiborne was removed
voted to impeach Claiborne on four articles of impeachment, all of which concerned the
criminal act of such filing false income tax returns. There was no direct connection
between Claiborne's criminal acts and any judicial function. Ultimately, the Senate voted
to convict Claiborne on three of the four articles and removed him from office. See 132
CONG. REC. 29,870-72 (1986).
217. MODERN PRECEDENTS, supra note 187, at 6 (statement of Judge Claiborne's
defense counsel, Oscar Goodman).
218. One House Manager, Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, raised the same objection to the
judicial function theory that would be leveled at the executive function theory: "'[I]t
would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape, or
perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from office by the U.S.
Senate.'" Id. (quoting Rep. Kastenmeier). This position was shared by a member of the
Senate who spoke out against such a limitation:
"There is neither historical nor logical reason to believe that the Framers of the
Constitution sought to prohibit the House from impeaching... an officer of the
United States who had committed treason or bribery or any other high crime or
misdemeanor which is a serious offense against the government of the United
States and which indicates that the official is unfit to exercise public
responsibilities, but which is an offense which is technically unrelated to the
officer's particular job responsibilities."
Id. at 7 (quoting statement of Sen. Charles Mathias, Jr., during the trial of Judge
Claiborne).
219. 132 CONG. REC. 17,297 (1986) (statement of Rep. Fish). One other House
Manager rejecting Claiborne's argument was future House Judiciary Chairman-and
House Manager in the Clinton trial-Henry Hyde, who stated that "the decision to
impeach and convict ... stands as an admonition to others in public life. It is an
opportunity for Congress to restate and reemphasize the standards of both personal and
professional conduct expected of those holding high Federal office." Id. at 17,300
(statement of Rep. Hyde).
220. The House Managers emphasized the Claiborne case in response to the executive
function theory presented in defense of President Clinton. See 145 CONG. REC. S76 (daily
ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (" 'Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed
from office for... misconduct [that] had nothing to do with his official responsibilities' ")
(incorporating statement of the House Managers).
1999] 1835
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for conduct incompatible with his station or status.221 The act of
peIjury about tax evasion was not the violation of a judicial function.
It was, however, an impeachable and removable offense.
14. Alcee L. Hastings (1988-89)
The impeachment of Judge Alcee Hastings of the U.S. District
Court of the Southern District of Florida illustrates the modern trend
of impeaching judges after criminal trials.22 Hastings was acquitted in
a criminal trial of charges of conspiracy and bribery.2 The House
voted almost unanimously to refer seventeen articles of impeachment
to the Senate, and the Senate voted to convict Hastings on eight of
these articles. 5  The final vote may reflect a conscious view that,
even if the evidence did not meet a standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" for a jury, each senator may apply her own standard in
judging such conduct. 6  Despite his acquittal at trial, Hastings falls
squarely into a judicial function model.
15. Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1988-89)
Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi was the last federal judge tried in the
221. The House voted to impeach Claiborne on four articles, all of which concerned
the criminal act of tax evasion unrelated to bribery and the filing of a false financial
statement. There was no direct connection between Claiborne's criminal acts and any
judicial function. Ultimately, the Senate voted to convict Claiborne on three of the four
articles. The basis for removal was most evident in the fourth article. See H.R. Res. 461,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 3,41-42 (1986).
222. See S. REP. No. 101-156, at 1-3 (1989); H. REP. No. 100-810, at 1-5 (1988).
223. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1096-97
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
224. See H.R. Res. 499, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 20,211-22 (1988)
(recording a vote of 413 to 3 in favor of impeachment). Like Swayne, the Hastings
impeachment was the result of a referral from the Judicial Conference of the United
States, which conducted its own investigation into the criminal charges of which Hastings
was acquitted. See REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE TO THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 338-39 (1986); see also Alan I. Baron, The Curious
Case of Alcee Hastings, 19 NOVA L. REV. 873, 874 (1995) (noting that the Judicial
Investigating Committee reviewed "approximately 2800 exhibits ... [and] issued a report
which concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Hastings had in fact
engaged in a corrupt conspiracy with Borders to solicit a bribe").
225. See 135 CONG. REC. 25,329-35 (1989).
226. Hastings ultimately would produce the strangest aftermath of any impeachment
case by first winning a seat to the House of Representatives and then sharing his unique
view of impeachment in the Clinton proceedings. See 144 CONG. REC. H11,774, H11,823
(daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hastings) ("This House can work its will on
censure and anything else. I was removed from office after being found not guilty, and
here we are talking we cannot censure.").
1836 [Vol. 77
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES
Senate. By the time of this Senate trial, Nixon already had been
convicted in a criminal trial on two counts of making false statements
to a grand jury which was investigating bribery allegations against
him.227 Nixon arrived at the Senate with the ignoble distinction of a
unanimous House impeachment vote, 417 to O.P The Senate did not,
however, convict Judge Nixon on the basis of the bribery allegations.
Instead, it removed the judge for the crime of lying under oath to a
federal grand jury, the same charge later leveled against President
Clinton. 29 Nixon's case stemmed from a drug prosecution of Drew
Fairchild, who was a business partner of Judge Nixon. Since the
prosecution was a state case, Nixon was not directly involved or
capable of direct intervention; however, Nixon spoke to the state's
prosecutor, an acquaintance of Nixon, who agreed to drop the case.
The House did not view this as impeachable conduct. The
impeachable conduct occurred when Nixon first denied any
involvement to the FBI and then to a federal grand jury. Nixon's
intervention for a personal friend, therefore, was not treated as the
basis for a "high crime or misdemeanor." It was Nixon's illegal effort
to conceal such conduct that proved his undoing. This was not a
violation of a judicial function or use of office. It was, however,
sufficient misconduct for his impeachment and removal3 0
16. Terminated Judicial Cases
Academic studies of impeachment cases often conflate questions
of conduct that is impeachable and conduct that is not impeachable.
The roles of the House and the Senate are often treated as redundant
despite the historical and textual support for distinct roles. In
determining the scope of impeachable offenses, the House provides
the most direct evidence, not the Senate. The Senate may choose to
retain a judge or president despite evidence of guilt based on a variety
of considerations. The role of the House is to determine if the
conduct is an impeachable offense. This author previously defended
the "grand jury" model in another article, a model which the House
227. See Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Impeachment Inquiry: Hearings on H. Res. 407
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
228. See 135 CONG. REC. 8823-24 (1989).
229. Judge Nixon was indicted on one count of bribery and three counts of perjury.
See Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538, 543 (S.D. Miss. 1988). Nixon was impeached
on the basis of perjury and conduct bringing disrepute upon the judiciary. See S. REP. No.
101-164, at 1-3 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-36, at 15-16 (1989); 135 CONG. REc. 27,101-06
(1989).
230. See S. REP. No. 101-164, at 1-3.
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managers adopted-in the Clinton trial."1
If the House is the focus of a study of impeachable conduct,
academics must look not only to individuals who were tried by the
Senate but also to individuals who faced likely impeachment in the
House. Many judges have resigned shortly before or after
commencement of impeachment proceedings.232 These cases are
revealing because a number of them involve charges based on
personal misconduct. The judicial cases evidence some degree of self-
selection in the cases going before the Senate. Judges faced with
charges of personal misconduct (and the threat of a public trial)
appear more likely to resign than do judges accused of violations of
judicial dutiesP 3  By not considering these cases as part of the
relevant historical record, advocates of the executive function theory
ignore an entire set of cases revealing congressional views of
potentially impeachable conduct-views largely at odds with their
restrictive interpretation of the impeachment standard.
The House has pursued vigorously a variety of charges against
judges who resigned at the beginning of an inquiry,24 during an
231. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 262-66 (prepared statement of Professor
Turley); Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part III.).
232. At least 24 judges have left the bench under allegations of wrongdoing or
misconduct. These judges include: William Stephens (1818), District Court Judge of the
District of Florida; Matthias B. Tallmadge (1818), District Court Judge of the District of
New York; Thomas Irwin (1859), District Court Judge of the Western District of
Pennsylvania; Charles Sherman (1873), District Court Judge of the Northern District of
Ohio; Richard Busteed (1874), District Court Judge of the Middle District of Alabama;
Edward H. Durrell (1874), District Court Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana;
William Story (1875), District Court Judge for the Western District of Arkansas; Peter S.
Grosscup (1911), Court of Appeals Judge for the Seventh Circuit; Cornelius H. Hanford
(1912), District Court Judge of the Western District for the District of Washington; Daniel
T. Wright (1914), District Court Judge for the District of the District of Columbia; John A.
Marshall (1915), District Court Judge of the District of Utah; Kenesaw M. Landis (1922),
District Court Judge of the Northern District of Illinois; Francis A. Winslow (1929),
District Court Judge of the Southern District of New York; Joseph Buffington (1938),
Court of Appeals Judge of the Third Circuit; Martin T. Manton (1939), Court of Appeals
Judge of the Second Circuit; Edwin S. Thomas (1939), District Court Judge of the District
of Connecticut; Warren Davis (1941) of Court of Appeals Judge of the Third Circuit;
Albert W. Johnson (1945), District Court Judge of the Middle District of Pennsylvania;
Abe Fortas (1969), Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; Otto Kerner (1974),
Court of Appeals Judge of the Seventh Circuit; Herbert A. Fogel (1978), District Court
Judge of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Robert Collins (1993), U.S. District Court
Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana; and Robert Aguilar (1996), District Court
Judge of the Northern District of California. As noted above, two judges, Mark H.
Delahay (1872) and George W. English (1926), resigned after impeachment.
233. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
234. This occurred in the case of Judge Francis Winslow (1929) of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Winslow was accused of conduct "so bad
that it has shocked both the bench and the bar; so bad that it is reflecting on the integrity
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investigation by the House Judiciary Committee,"' after submission
of a report to the floor,z 6 or even after their case was submitted to the
SenateY7 Other judges resigned after indictment?38 or conviction,2 9
of that court; and unless we have an investigation either to ascertain the truth of these
charges or otherwise, the people of that district will lose confidence in that court." 70
CONG. REC. 3334 (1929) (statement of Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia of New York). The
accusations included harassment of attorneys, intimidation of witnesses, favoritism in
appointments for a friend, Marcus Helfand, and consistently ruling in favor of litigants
represented by Mr. Helfand. See 70 CONG. REc. 3334-35 (1929). On the day of the
formal inquiry by the House, Winslow resigned and, through counsel, stated that "'the
prestige of the court would be impaired should he return to it, and this he could not for
himself endure, nor could he allow it to continue as an embarrassment to the other
judges.'" 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 550 at 792-93 (quoting Judge
Winslow's letter of resignation).
235. This occurred in the case of Judge William Story of the Western District of
Arkansas, who appeared before a House investigating committee in 1874 on charges of
questionable court expenditures and improper bail judgments. After his testimony,
described by the committee as" 'lame, disconnected and unsatisfactory,' "Story resigned.
Van Tassel, supra note 172, at 368 (quoting The Daily Gazette, ARK. GAZETrE, June 9,
1874).
236. For example, Judge E. H. Durell of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Louisiana was charged in 1874 with a variety of offenses ranging from
drunkenness to more serious bankruptcy improprieties with an individual named E.E.
Norton. The House Judiciary Committee noted that "'[t]he most intimate social relations
existed between Judge Durell and Norton .... They traveled North together in the
summer and spent much of their time together.'" 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71,
§ 2508, at 1013 (quoting the majority report of the House Judiciary Committee). After the
Judiciary Committee recommended impeachment, Durell resigned. See 3 id. §§ 2508-09,
at 1014-15.
237. Judge Mark W. Delahay of the U.S. District of Kansas resigned after
impeachment but before his Senate trial. See supra notes 172 and accompanying text.
Likewise, George English resigned after the formal commencement of his Senate trial.
See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
238. These judges include Judge Martin T. Manton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit and Judge Albert W. Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, who resigned in 1939 and 1945, respectively, in the aftermath of
criminal indictments. See Van Tassel, supra note 172, at 390 n.262, app. tbl.1 at 415, 416.
239. For example, Judge Robert Collins of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana resigned when the House indicated that impeachment proceedings
would begin after his conviction appeal was denied in United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d
1385, 1415 (5th Cir. 1992). Collins was accused of granting a low sentence for a drug
smuggler in exchange for $100,000. Through the cooperation of a co-conspirator, the
federal investigators not only taped Collins in meetings with the defendant but also found
marked bribery money in his pockets and in his office credenza. See Victor Williams,
Third Branch Independence and Integrity Threatened by Political Branch Irresponsibility:
Reviewing the Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 5
SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 851, 911-12 (1995) (noting that Collins had $180 in marked bills
in his pockets when searched by the FBI and $16,000 in the credenza). Similarly, Judge
Robert Aguilar of the U.S. District Court for Northern California resigned after
completion of a criminal case in which he ultimately was acquitted-but remained under
lingering suspicions of guilt. Judge Aguilar was accused of various types of criminal
conduct, including racketeering, disclosure of wiretap evidence, and attempting to
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but before almost certain impeachment inquiry.24 These cases
support a broad definition of impeachable offenses which
encompasses any act-including non-criminal conduct-that would
bring disrepute upon the office.24 While the announcement of an
impeachment inquiry does not establish a clear congressional view of
the scope of impeachable offenses, these cases often indicate that a
majority of the voting members of the House believed the alleged
conduct could warrant impeachment, and that, for the targeted
judges, some charges were too embarrassing or costly to contest in the
impeachment process. These cases admittedly are of a lesser order
than the precedent of actual impeachments, but they are part of the
relevant historical record.
Resignation was the course of choice for judges who were
unwilling to weather a full trial or the possibility of losing a judicial
pension.242 Some of these resignations followed sexual scandals. For
influence a criminal proceeding for a former union official. See United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 595-97 (1995); United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994).
After the first jury deadlocked, the Justice Department prosecuted him a second time and
secured a conviction for obstruction of justice and disclosing wiretap evidence. See
Aguilar, 21 F.3d at 1478. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the
conviction on the basis of a jury instruction violation. See id. at 1487. When both House
and Senate members advocated impeachment hearings, Judge Aguilar resigned in 1996.
The Justice Department agreed to drop further prosecutorial efforts due to the
resignation. See Lionel Van Deerlin, A Plea-Bargain Nightmare: The Case of Officially
Sanctioned Obstruction of Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 4, 1996, at B5.
240. The Justice Department investigated Judge Albert W. Johnson of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania following accusations that he was using his
court as a "medium in the formation and operation of an unconscionable, a despicable,
and a degrading conspiracy against the administration of justice." H.R. REP. No. 79-1639,
at 44 (1946). This alleged conduct included favoritism, corruption, coercion of federal
employees to rent apartments in buildings owned by him (at higher rents than other
tenants), and other abuses. See id. at 43-44. Johnson succeeded in halting the House
impeachment inquiry by resigning on July 3, 1945, but he could not avoid indictment by a
grand jury on September 11, 1945. See BORKIN, supra note 159, at 182-83.
241. This is not to suggest that personal misconduct played a more significant role in
these cases than official misconduct. Many of the reported cases do involve forms of
official misconduct. In 1941, one of the most outrageous cases resulted in two
resignations. Judge Warren Davis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was
accused of writing and selling decisions under the name of another judge, Senior Judge
Joseph Buffington, who was described as "aging, deaf, and nearly blind," Van Tassel,
supra note 172, at 369, and "helpless and senile," BORKIN, supra note 159, at 101. After a
jury was unable to reach a verdict in Davis's criminal trial, the Justice Department asked
Congress to impeach the judge, but Davis agreed to resign to forestall impeachment. The
hapless Judge Buffington also resigned. For a discussion of this case, see BORKIN, supra
note 159, at 101-37.
242. This appeared to be the case with Judge Robert Aguilar of the District Court of
the Northern District of California. Consistent with the Hastings case, Congress indicated
that it would commence impeachment proceedings despite the reversal of Aguilar's
conviction for various acts of criminal conduct, but Judge Aguilar resigned in 1996. Both
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example, Judge John Marshall of the U.S. District Court for Utah
resigned in 1915 after he "became enmeshed in a scandal involving
the cleaning woman of his courtroom."2 43  Likewise, some judges
faced impeachment over either personal misconduct or conduct
preceding their service on the bench.2' Judge Delahay of the District
of Kansas chose to resign rather than face a Senate trial over
"personal habits."2 45 Judge Herbert Fogel of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania left the bench after he
invoked the Fifth Amendment during grand jury testimony
concerning irregular business activities that preceded his appointment
to the bench.246 Judge Fogel was accused of criminal conduct
unrelated to his judicial office.247 Circuit Judge Cornelius Hanford of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington faced
imminent impeachment when he resigned under allegations that
included "'being an habitual drunkard'" and "'being morally and
temperamentally unfit to hold a judicial position.' "2I His lawyer
Congress and the Justice Department considered a full impeachment inquiry to be
unnecessary after Aguilar's resignation. See supra note 239. Resignation may be an
acceptable resolution for Congress since, as a former House Judiciary Committee
chairman once explained, "'[w]hy kick at the place where the fellow used to be?'"
BORKIN, supra note 159, at 28 (quoting Rep. Hatton Sumners, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee).
243. CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL FEDERAL JUDGES FOR THE
TERRITORY OF UTAH 1848-1896 AND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES FOR THE
DIsTRICr OF UTAH 1896-1978, at 57-58 (1988). While such grounds would not be grounds
for impeachment absent some aggravating element or criminality, the element of personal
scandal predictably would increase the likelihood of a resignation in a judicial controversy.
244. Judge Peter Grosscup of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
resigned in 1911, allegedly because of an impending magazine article which reportedly
would offer scandalous information. See Van Tassel, supra note 172, at 387. Grosscup
resigned before possible impeachment in the face of "'allegations of malfeasance never
having been formally made or proven-yet not disproven.'" Id. (quoting RAYMAN L.
SOLOMON, HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1941, at 88 (1981)).
245. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. The resignation technically
terminated the case in the Senate, not the House.
246. See Van Tassel, supra note 172, at 385.
247. Fogel was accused of securing a federal contract for a building (that he owned
with then Sen. Hugh Scott) with falsified or fraudulent documents. Even though there
were lower bids, Fogel's Gateway Center won the federal contract because of the
discrepancies, which were uncovered by the Justice Department. See Ronald Kessler,
GSA Favored Senator's Friend in Lease, WASH. POST., Oct. 1, 1978, at Al. As with Judge
Aguilar, the Justice Department agreed to drop any criminal prosecution in exchange for
Fogel's resignation. See Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving
Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REV.
1209,1218 & n.53 (1991).
248. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 526, at 746 (quoting statement of
Rep. Berger); see also H. REP. NO. 62-1152, 48 CONG. REC. 10,307-08 (1912)
(incorporating report of the House Judiciary Committee regarding the impeachment
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appeared before the investigating subcommittee to announce that
Judge Hanford had decided to resign, which successfully terminated
the proceedings.249 Judge Daniel Thew Wright, Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, resigned after the
commencement of a formal impeachment inquiryY Wright's charges
included "'being guilty of various ... acts of personal and judicial
misconduct;' " and "'being morally and temperamentally unfit to
hold judicial office.' "2-1
Two judges resigned under allegations of bribery unrelated to
judicial office. Judge Charles T. Sherman of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio was accused of " 'propos[ing] to
corruptly control legislation for money, to be paid to him by the stock
exchange of New York, and subsequently insisted on such payment
on the ground of such control, and threatened adverse legislation if
the same was not paid.' "252 A House resolution proposed a finding
that "'his said pretenses of power to control legislation and his said
assertions of services he had rendered in this respect were false.' ,,253
Sherman resigned and soon thereafter died, terminating any further
impeachment proceedings.254 Judge Otto Kerner, Jr., of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also resigned after he was
convicted for conduct preceding his service. Kerner was charged with
bribery, fraud, and tax evasion during his term as Governor of
Illinois 5
Professor Pollitt noted two judges who were reprimanded for
private conduct as an alternative to impeachment 5 6 Yet, these cases
do not appear to support his intended point-that impeachment has
been routinely confined to public misdeeds to the exclusion of private
misdeeds. The first judge, Judge Peter B. Bruin, presiding judge of
the Mississippi Territory, was investigated by the House at the
request of the territorial legislature for "'neglect of duty and
resolution for Judge Hanford).
249. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 526, at 747-48 (incorporating report
of the House Judiciary Committee).
250. See 6 id., § 528, at 752-54.
251. 6 d2 § 528, at 752 (quoting statement of Rep. Frank Park of Georgia). These
charges also included official misdeeds and, rather ominously, "'bearing deadly weapons
in violation of law.'" 6 Id. (quoting Rep. Park).
252. 3 HINDs' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, § 2511, at 1019 (quoting resolution
proposed by Rep. Clarkson N. Potter of New York).
253. 3 Id. § 2511, at 1020 (quoting resolution of Rep. Potter).
254. See 3 id
255. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,1131 (7th Cir. 1973).
256. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 267.
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drunkenness on the bench.' "I' Congress did not believe that such
conduct was unimpeachable, as Professor Pollitt has suggested.
Rather, an investigation was delayed because Congress questioned
the logistics of impeaching territorial officers and further questioned
the value of evidence submitted by a territorial legislature. 8 The
House Judiciary Committee resolved that it could investigate the
matter and further resolved that a deposition be taken with Bruin's
invited participation. 9 The resolution calling for Bruin's appearance
was agreed to on April 21, 1808, but House records then indicate that
the proceedings were terminated because of "the death or resignation
of Judge Bruin.""26
The second judge noted by Professor Pollitt as a "West Virginia
[judge] accused of being drunk on duty"26' is an apparent reference to
William E. Baker, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of
West Virginia. Little is known about Judge Baker except that he was
accused of drunkenness, with the primary charge alleging that he had
used his office to obtain confiscated liquor.262 The House Judiciary
Committee investigated Baker but ultimately found insufficient basis
for impeachment.2 63  Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the House
routinely defined impeachable offenses as including " ' "conduct such
as drunkenness when habitual." ,264 Habitual drunkenness is one of
257. 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 71, § 2487, at 983 (quoting resolution of the
Mississippi territorial legislature).
258. See 3 id. § 2487, at 984 (noting that there was some question whether the House
should act on the authority of a state or territorial legislature as well as doubt as to the
evidentiary value of a territorial resolution). This question was first raised in the
requested impeachment of Judge George Turner, a territorial judge in Northern Ohio, in
1796. Turner was accused of a variety of injudicious acts ranging from holding court
"'unknown to and contrary to the laws of the Territory' at a iemote and inconvenient
place" to his denial of constitutional rights to people based on their "use of the French
language." 3 Id. § 2486, at 982 (quoting petition from the territorial legislature). The
House chose not to proceed to impeachment when the Attorney General Charles Lee
communicated to the House that he was "'of opinion that it will be more advisable, on
account of the expense, the delay, the certain difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining
the attendance here of the witnesses who reside in the Territory northwest of the Ohio,
about the distance of 1,500 miles, that the prosecution should not be carried on by
impeachment, but by information on indictment before the supreme court of that
Territory.'" 3 Id § 2486, at 982-83 (quoting letter from Charles Lee, U.S. Attorney
General).
259. See 3 id § 2487, at 984.
260. 3 Id.
261. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 267.
262. See BORKIN, supra note 159, at 222.
263. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 543, at 778.
264. 6 Id. § 545, at 780 (quoting House Judiciary Committee report concerning Judge
George W. English (quoting an unnamed writer)).
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the first bases for impeachment articulated by Congress2 65 and is
consistent with later articles of impeachment intended to protect the
perceived integrity and legitimacy of the courts.
17. Summary
The terminated impeachment cases support the conclusions
derived from the fifteen judicial impeachment cases. Together, they
establish that Congress always has followed a broad definition of
impeachment that includes non-criminal conduct and not simply
abuse of judicial authority. This does not mean that official
misconduct was not the primary concern of past impeachments.
Instead, the impeachment and terminated judicial cases demonstrate
a much broader view of impeachable offenses than that suggested by
advocates of the executive function theory or the judicial function
theory. While Professor Pollitt referred to impeachable "crimes," the
actual cases show that impeachable offenses include non-criminal acts
under the intended meaning of "misdemeanors" as misdeeds. As
noted above, Congress has repeatedly rejected the view that
impeachment of judicial officers is limited to actions taken "in a
judicial capacity. '266 The appropriate question is not whether officials
can be removed for non-criminal conduct, but rather what is the
scope of non-criminal conduct for which they can be removed. The
most common impeachment allegation, "tyrannical" or abusive use of
judicial authority, is not a crime but is impeachable. Likewise,
alcoholism and abusive personal conduct have been cited repeatedly
as impeachable if proven. Congress has recognized in these cases that
the judicial system rests in no small part on the perceived legitimacy
of the judicial officers in ruling on conflicts. The House Judiciary
Committee made this point in the case of Judge English:
"A civil officer may have behaved in public so as to bring
disgrace upon himself and shame upon the country and he
would continue to do this until his name became a public
stench and yet might not be subject to indictment under any
law of the United States, but he certainly could be
impeached. Otherwise the public would in this and kindred
cases be beyond the protection intended by the
Constitution. When the Constitution says a judge shall hold
office during good behavior it means that he shall not hold it
265. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
266. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 131, at 174 (statement from
impeachment of Judge Robert Archbald with reference to the same argument raised and
rejected in the case of Judge West Humphreys).
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when his behavior ceases to be good behavior. 267
A misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment has always
included misconduct, even personal misconduct, that robs a judge of
the authority required for his position. In the same fashion, these
judicial cases demonstrate that any criminal conduct can be grounds
for impeachment and not simply criminal conduct related to office or
"great crimes." It is not the subject of the criminal conduct but the
criminal conduct itself that members of Congress often cite in
pursuing impeachment and removal. 68 For example, it would be
curious for Congress to forego impeachment of a judge convicted of
molestation or tax evasion. Even if the judge is not incarcerated, the
status of the judicial office requires that the judge be faithful to the
laws that he is enforcing. Consider the case of Sol Wachtler, former
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Wachtler admitted
to a pattern of stalking and harassment directed against his former
girlfriend, Joy Silverman. 69 Wachtler was arrested and pleaded
guilty. Had Wachtler been on the federal court and received
probation, would there be any question that his conduct warranted
removal, despite the fact that it was not related to a judicial function?
If Wachtler had only committed a civil violation in harassing a child,
would the conduct be insufficient for removal? Congress has never
adopted such a position, as was most evident in the impeachments of
judges Claiborne and Delahay. Nonetheless, Professor Pollitt went to
considerable lengths to show that past impeachments were based
solely on judicial misdeeds. Professor Pollitt's vision of a judicial
function theory simply would not work given the host of criminal and
personal misdeeds that a judge may commit outside of his official
duties.
In another work, I present an alternative to the executive
function theory and its public/private distinction. This alternative
theory suggests a criminallnoncriminal distinction in structuring
267. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 176, § 545, at 780 (quoting report of the
House Judiciary Committee).
268. This point was made by Senator George Mitchell in justifying his vote to remove
Judge Claiborne, who was charged with conduct unrelated to his office: "A convicted
felon simply cannot sit as a Federal Judge. I repeat that, a convicted felon cannot be
permitted to sit as a Federal judge. It would totally undermine respect for law and
authority in our country." S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 339 (1986) (prepared statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
269. Among other acts, Wachtler sent graphic sexual messages and a condom to
Silverman's 14-year-old daughter. See John J. Goldman, Ex-N. Y Judge Gets 15 Months
for Threats, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at A4; Judge Who Harassed Lover Gets 15 Months
in Prison, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 10, 1993, at A14.
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impeachment decisions by the House.27 As an initial matter,
Congress should take note of any criminal element to the alleged
conduct. In cases of alleged criminal misconduct, the House should
apply a presumption that the conduct should be referred to the
Senate for trial. This presumption may be rebutted in cases of minor
criminal acts such as drunk driving, but the burden will be on the
subject officer. Conversely, in allegations of non-criminal conduct,
the presumption should be against referral to the Senate. Some acts
of non-criminal conduct would still warrant impeachment. For
example, if the judge engaged in a pattern of virulent racist, sexist, or
other forms of discriminatory conduct, Congress should seriously
consider impeachment; however, if the judge engaged in personal
misconduct, such as sexual misconduct that did not involve violations
of federal law, there should be a heavy presumption against
impeachment. The judicial impeachment cases appear to reflect such
a distinction. In cases of personal misconduct due to alcoholism, the
House often demanded evidence of habitual intoxication that affected
the judge's perceived ability to carry out his duties.271 The House,
however, has the power to decide what conduct is so incompatible or
inimical to judicial office to warrant impeachment. The Framers
made this decision unreviewable precisely because it is a decision
heavily imbued with political judgment. It is a legitimacy question
framed by one house and resolved by the other.2 In this system, the
broad definition of impeachment is essential to raise questions of
judicial legitimacy rather than allow them to fester below the surface
to the detriment of both the judge and the judicial system.
B. Presidential Impeachments
The presidential impeachment cases reveal the prophetic
character of Alexander Hamilton's prediction that impeachment will
generally "agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide
270. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.C.).
271. See supra notes 136,167-68, 194 and accompanying text.
272. By impeaching, the House raises and defines a question of legitimacy for the
Senate to resolve. This question of legitimacy may be due to personal or criminal conduct.
Ultimately, however, it is the expectations of the office that will dictate the continued
viability of the judicial officer to continue in office through a vote of retention by the
Senate. This second vote of the Senate to retain an impeached judge is a vote of consent
that returns an element of legitimacy to a judicial officer. Like the first vote to appoint a
judge, the Senate's vote of acquittal establishes not only that the judge is not guilty of the
allegations but that the judge continues to have the authority to rule on the cases of their
constituents.
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it into parties, more or less friendly, or inimical, to the accused."' 73
Professor Pollitt reviews three such cases involving President
Johnson, President Nixon, and President Clinton. As with Professor
Pollitt's review, there is no need to present the cases in detail. The
cases are most relevant in determining whether evidence exists to
support an executive function theory. These three cases constitute
the most important, but not the only, cases in which impeachment
was sought. Presidents John Tyler,274 Grover Cleveland, 75 Herbert
Hoover,276 Harry Truman,277 Ronald Reagan,27 8 and George Bush279
were also subject to impeachment allegations but not formal
inquiries. These terminated presidential cases tended to be raw
political gestures and offer little for an academic review.8 0
Nevertheless, the three cases identified by Professor Pollitt are clearly
the most significant and relevant to this review.
1. Andrew Johnson (1868)
The articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson offer little
to resolve the question of the basis for an executive function theory.
Johnson was impeached on unfounded grounds involving his
constitutional right to remove a cabinet member, Secretary of War
Edwin Stanton. 81  Ironically, the problem with the Johnson
impeachment is that the Radical Republicans simply picked the
wrong grounds for impeachment. The final impeachment language
273. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 79, at 334 (Alexander Hamilton).
274. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.C.); see also
STEPHEN W. STATHIS & DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: A HISTORICAL
OvERvIEv 2-3 (1998).
275. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.C.); see also
STATHIs & HuCKABEE, supra note 274, at 7-8 (identifying impeachment allegations).
276. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part TV.C.); see also
STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 274, at 8-9 (identifying impeachment allegations).
277. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.C.); see also
STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 274, at 9-11 (identifying impeachment allegations).
278. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.C.); see also
STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 274, at 18-19 (identifying impeachment allegations).
279. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part IV.C.); see also
STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 274, at 20-21 (identifying impeachment allegations).
280. In another work, however, I suggest that impeachment may have been
underutilized in presidential cases. See Turley, Factional Disputes, supra note 17
(manuscript at Part IV.C.).
281. See generally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON (1973) (discussing in detail the facts of the Johnson case); MILTON
LOMASK, ANDREW JOHNSON: PRESIDENT ON TRIAL (1973) (same); GENE SMITH, HIGH
CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS: THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
(1977) (same).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was only the last in a series of impeachment attempts arising from
Johnson's refusal to carry out federal laws benefiting African-
Americans.' He was a virulent racist who refused to assist freed
slaves and condemned their participation in government as a threat to
civilization. 3 Johnson strongly suggested that, if Congress persisted
in such efforts, he considered it worthy ground for a second Civil
War.34
The Johnson case raises an interesting contemporary question.
What if a modem President took an overtly racist position, refused to
hire or assist African-Americans, and spoke against blacks as an
inferior race? The First Amendment clearly protects such speech, but
impeachment should protect the office and the public from such
injurious conduct. The President's refusals to carry out federal laws
protecting African-Americans could be made the subject of court
orders and contempt sanctions. If, however, the President continued
to refuse to obey the court orders, there would be ample basis for
impeachment. Such a refusal to comply with judicial orders (once
appeals are exhausted) threatens the core guarantees of separation of
powers in the tripartite system. Even putting aside possible violations
of civil rights laws in hiring practices, the President's campaign
against the rights of millions of Americans would raise a basis for
impeachment. Johnson certainly can claim to be more "sinned
against that sinner" in his impeachment trial; however, had the
Radical Republicans pushed Johnson into court over his efforts to
obstruct federal laws, a highly defensible case for impeachment could
have been presented.
2. Richard M. Nixon (1974)
Impeachment proceedings against President Nixon were
suspended due to the resignation of the President after the House
Judiciary Committee approved articles of impeachment.
Nevertheless, the case has been woven into the account supporting an
executive function theory. According to Professor Pollitt and other
academics, the Nixon articles of impeachment reflected the view that
282. See LES BENEDIcT, supra note 281, at 44; James N. Turman, Public Keeps Raising
Bar for Ousting Clinton, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 1998, at 1 (noting support of
minority groups and women's groups in the impeachment crisis).
283. See Factional Disputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at IV.C.1.) (discussing
Johnson's hostility to legislation assisting freed blacks); see also LES BENEDICT, supra
note 281, at 75 (describing Johnson's views toward African-Americans). But see LOMASK,
supra note 281, at 143 (characterizing Johnson's attitude toward African-Americans not as
racist but as one of Southern "paternalism").
284. See FactionalDisputes, supra note 17 (manuscript at IV.C.1.).
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impeachable offenses are those confined to official abuses. Professor
Pollitt emphasized provisions in three articles alleging "abuse of
powers."'  The three articles of impeachment approved by the
House Judiciary Committee actually alleged obstruction of justice,1
86
abuse of power,27 and defiance of committee subpoenas.Ps Article I
alleged violations of federal law very similar to the conduct alleged
against President Clinton. President Nixon was accused of seeking
"'to delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of'" the June 17,
1972, break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters
and attempting "'to cover-up, conceal and protect those
responsible' " as well as trying " 'to conceal the existence and scope
of other unlawful covert activities.' "u9 Nixon's impeachable conduct
also included" 'approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling
witnesses ... [to give] false or misleading statements' "290 and various
abusive uses of federal agencies.2 91 An influential report published by
the New York Bar Association during the Nixon hearings addressed
directly the scope of impeachable offenses:
It is our conclusion ... that the grounds for impeachment
are not limited to or synonymous with crimes (indeed, acts
constituting a crime may not be sufficient for the
impeachment of an officeholder in all circumstances).
Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity
of government are appropriate grounds whether or not they
happen to constitute offenses under the general criminal
law. In our view, the essential nexus to damaging the
integrity of government may be found in acts which
constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of,
official position. It may also be found in acts which, without
directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that
degree of public confidence in the probity of executive and
judicial officers that is essential to the effectiveness of
government in a free society.... At the heart of the matter
is the determination--committed by the Constitution to the
sound judgment of the two Houses of Congress-that the
officeholder has demonstrated by his actions that he is unfit
285. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 279.
286. See 3 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 14, § 15.13, at 639-40 (1974)
(incorporating the first article of impeachment).
287. See 3 id at 640-41 (incorporating the second article of impeachment).
288. See 3 id. at 641 (incorporating the third article of impeachment).
289. 3 Id at 639 (quoting the first article of impeachment).
290. 3 Id. (quoting the first article of impeachment).
291. See 3 id. at 640-41 (incorporating the second article of impeachment).
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to continue in the office in question.29
Advocates of the executive function theory find the Nixon case
appealing because it involves conduct that appears of a higher order
of crime, such as breaking into the offices of political opponents. Yet,
ultimately this judgment is highly subjective. In the Clinton case,
many academics viewed obstruction of justice in a civil rights case,
after a unanimous Supreme Court decision, to be a criminal act of the
highest order. Likewise, perjury before a federal judge and later
before a federal grand jury easily would meet the standard of some
academics. The difference is that obstruction in the Nixon case
occurred in a political context as opposed to a personal context. Both
acts, however, involved the same crime and the same intent to cover-
up facts and to frustrate the operations of another independent
branch.
3. William J. Clinton (1999)
In reviewing the Clinton case, I have Professor Pollitt at a
disadvantage since he completed his article before President Clinton's
impeachment 93 Ultimately, the House demonstrated the same split
on the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" that was evident
among the nineteen academics who testified before the Judiciary
Committee. The Republicans and the few Democrats who voted in
favor of two of the articles of impeachment concluded that, while
sexual misconduct itself is not impeachable, such private conduct
becomes impeachable when a president engages in perjury or
obstruction of justice in response to an inquiry. The focus of this
article is not to reargue the facts of the Clinton case but to explore the
constitutional claims advanced in support of an executive function
theory. This theory developed in its full form as part of the
opposition to the impeachment of President Clinton, and appeared
outcome-determinative in that case. Yet, to support such a threshold
claim, academics struggled to make the constitutional and historical
records consistent-the most basic requirement of constitutional
mythology.
In discussing the Clinton case, Professor Pollitt cited the prior
judicial and presidential cases to support his conclusion that an
impeachment of Clinton "would be the first time in our history of
292. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 18-19 (1974).
293. See Pollitt, supra note 11, at 261 ("[lIt is unlikely that impeachment would
ultimately succeed in the House, if the House members respond to public sentiment.").
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over two hundred years that a federal officer is charged with
misconduct unrelated to the discharge of the duties of his office."2 94
While advanced by other academics, this claim is demonstrably
incorrect. Various judges were accused of misconduct that was not
related to the discharge of their offices, including Judge Claiborne,
who was removed for tax evasion unrelated to any allegation of
bribery.295 Nevertheless, Professor Pollitt asked a series of questions
which deserve answers:
[I]n a larger sense, the allegations against Clinton do not fit
the language, spirit, or history of our Impeachment Clause.
Where are the great and dangerous offenses "against the
state" demanded by the framers of our Constitution?
Where, as in the Andrew Johnson impeachment, is the
failure "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed?"
Where, as in the Richard Nixon impeachment, are the
"[a]ttempts to subvert the Constitution?" '296
Professor Pollitt's first question was answered in the earlier
discussion of the views of the framers-specifically George Mason.
The Framers did not articulate a standard of offenses "against the
state."297  This argument is more of a mythological than a
constitutional "demand." Professor Pollitt's second question is
curious. Various House members specifically based their decision to
vote in favor of impeachment on the Take Care Clause.2 8 It is
difficult to see how a president can fulfill his oath to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" when he is actively violating those
laws.299 President Clinton stood accused of obstruction of justice for
294. Id. at 280.
295. See supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
296. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 280 (citations omitted).
297. See supra notes 52-119 and accompanying text.
298. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, ci. 4 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed .... ).
299. From the outset, professors testifying against impeachment stressed, as Professor
Pollitt did, that "[o]rdinarily, prosecutors do not investigate perjury in a civil action."
Pollitt, supra note 11, at 279. Even though President Clinton stood accused of obstruction
of justice, this argument was central to his defense. In reality, however, individuals are
routinely prosecuted for perjury, and such prosecutions occur in both criminal and civil
cases. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.B.2.).
While Former Counsel Lawrence Walsh insisted that "in sixty years of practice, I have
never known this to happen," Lawrence E. Walsh, Kenneth Starr and the Independent
Counsel Act, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 5, 1998, at A4, this statement reflects an obvious
failure of even cursory research, not an absence of such cases. Actually, the Clinton
administration rejected arguments that prosecution of perjury in a dismissed civil case
involving sexual conduct is abusive, as have other administrations. See Turley, Congress as
Grand Jury, supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.B.2.) (discussing cases of Barbara
Battalino and other individuals convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice).
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frustrating discovery in a civil rights case after the Supreme Court
held unanimously that he could be sued in a civil action. Obstruction
of justice and perjury are violations directed as much against the
judicial process as they are against a particular litigant-a point
reaffirmed by the contempt order issued against President Clinton by
the federal judge overseeing the Paula Jones case."0 The difference
with Andrew Johnson is that Johnson was demonstrably innocent of
the alleged offense. Johnson could claim a compelling constitutional
interpretation of his authority in the matter of dismissing cabinet
officers. Clinton never claimed that he had the right to commit
crimes in office, only that he did not do so.
Professor Pollitt's final question assumed that an impeachable
offense must be based on an " 'attempt[] to subvert the
Constitution.' "301 This question also assumed that subversion was the
only basis for the Nixon impeachment, which it was not; however,
even if subversion was the standard for impeachable offenses, it could
be argued that any president who obstructs justice subverts the
Constitution. Professor Pollitt noted that a vast majority of
Americans did not want President Clinton removed from office.3"
This observation is correct. A more relevant series of polls, however,
showed that more than seventy percent of the public believed that
President Clinton committed crimes in office in response to the
threatened disclosure of his misconduct.0 3 The House was faced with
the question of whether there are circumstances in which a president
can commit crimes of perjury or obstruction without facing trial in the
Senate. Various academics even argued that, if high crimes and
misdemeanors were found, the House should not impeach in a kind of
congressional nullification.0 4 The House wisely rejected such
arguments. While President Clinton could rebut evidence that he
300. See supra note 116 (discussing the contempt order issued against President
Clinton).
301. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 280 (quoting 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 550 (statement of George Mason)).
302. See id. at 261.
303. See Richard Benedetto, Most in Poll Stand by Their President, USA TODAY, Jan.
12, 1999, at 5A (reporting results of a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll, one month before
the final Senate vote, showing that "a remarkable 79% say they already believe that
Clinton committed perjury and a majority of 53% agree he obstructed justice in the Paula
Jones lawsuit").
304. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 7, at 233 (testimony of Professor Susan Bloch)
("I can recommend that even if you believe that some of the allegations come close to
being impeachable offenses or even are impeachable, that you exercise your discretion in
this case to decide to terminate this proceeding without voting out any articles of
impeachment.").
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committed the crimes of perjury and obstruction, these were alleged
criminal acts that warranted Senate trial. Ultimately, the Senate
voted primarily along party lines, with fifty senators voting to convict
on the closest article.0
There is unlikely to be agreement on the underlying facts of the
Clinton case. The point of this rebuttal is not to defend the accuser
306
or attack the accused °.3  However, there was a pronounced tendency
305. The closest vote occurred on Article II, which alleged obstruction of justice, with
50 senators voting to convict and 50 senators voting to acquit. See 145 CONG. REC. S1459
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999). On Article I, which alleged perjury before a federal grand jury,
45 senators voted to convict and 55 senators voted to acquit. See id. at S1458.
306. All great mythologies have great monstrous mythological figures. The
constitutional mythology advanced in the Clinton case required a relentless villain and
pursued innocents. Academics such as Professor Pollitt reserved the villain role for Judge
Kenneth Starr. Professor Pollitt referred to "Starr's victims," such as Sidney Blumenthal,
who was asked about spreading stories about prosecutors' actions before the grand jury.
Pollitt, supra note 11, at 281 n.184. In reality, the grand jury itself accused Blumenthal of
misrepresenting prosecutors' questions. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Week of Reckoning for
the President, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1998, at A16 ("After Sidney Blumenthal stood
outside the federal courthouse and declared to the television cameras that the special
prosecutor had asked him improper questions-which in fact he had never been asked-a
grand jury foreman took the unusual step of rebuking Mr. Blumenthal when he appeared
in court again."). Moreover, Blumenthal was later alleged to have committed perjury
before the Senate after his testimony was specifically contradicted by the affidavits of
three individuals. See, e.g., Michael Dorman, More Controversy Over Blumenthal,
NEwSDAY, Feb. 17, 1999, at A4 (noting that three individuals had signed affidavits
contradicting Blumenthal's sworn statements in the Senate trial concerning his role in
spreading false stories as part of a White House smear campaign).
307. Professor Pollitt raises Judge Starr's allegedly abusive demand that "a top-to-
bottom search" be conducted at the White House for the First Lady's billing records
related to the Whitewater investigation. Pollitt, supra note 11, at 281 n.184; see also
Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5372995 ("The
first lady's billing records for legal work done on an allegedly illegal land deal relating to
Whitewater mysteriously turned up in the private residence of the White House nearly
two years after they had been subpoenaed."). Professor Pollitt does not mention that this
search followed a prior, unsuccessful search by White House attorneys for billing records
under subpoena. The White House attorneys declared that no billing records were located
on the premises, but two years later the critical records were discovered in the private
residence outside the First Lady's private office. See Naftali Bendavid, Starr Nearing
Indictment Decision on First Lady, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1998, at Al; David Willman &
Tom Schultz, Two Clinton Aides Testify Before Grand Jury, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at
A20.
Professor Pollitt also detailed the abusive treatment of Susan McDougal in refusing,
in her words, "'to lie about the President.'" Pollitt, supra note 11, at 281 n.184 (quoting
Russell Baker, For Whom the Chains Clank. Kenneth Starr's Deep Game, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1998, at A23). Yet, McDougal did not simply refuse to testify falsely-she also
refused to testify truthfully. See, e.g., Tom Squitieri, Trial May End, But the Tribulations
Continue, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1999, at 5A (describing McDougal's refusal to testify
before two grand juries). McDougal refused to testify at all because she claimed that she
did not approve of Judge Starr or his office. No prosecutors or court would fail to find
such conduct in contempt. Had McDougal testified truthfully and faced retribution for an
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to yield to a mythological demand for clear characters and answers to
contemporary controversies. Little clarity can be found in the Clinton
impeachment, perhaps a reflection on our times. The Clinton
impeachment left most of the issues debated by the academics at the
House hearing unresolved. President Clinton was impeached by
Democrats and Republicans who believed that he committed crimes
in office to conceal embarrassing personal misconduct. In this sense,
the House rejected the executive function theory. President Clinton
was acquitted, however, by Democrats and Republicans who gave
various explanations for their votes. Some found the charges credible
and sufficient to justify removal but did not believe that the House
managers had proven their case.308 Others found the charges proven
and sufficient to justify removal but found acquittal to be in the public
interest. 09 Others found the charges insufficient to justify removal
even if proven.3 10 Half of the Senate voted to remove the President
on the basis that one count was both proven and sufficient for
removal.311 As the personalities and passions of the crisis fade from
account favorable to the President, this abusive tale would be more compelling. These
accounts are the very heart of constitutional mythology: the need to present clarity in
cases with more complex and mixed messages. Abusers and the abused are often central
to mythological tales, but they are rarely so evident in actual constitutional cases.
308. See, e.g., John Bresnahan & Amy Keller, Senate Acquits President, ROLL CALL,
Feb. 15, 1999, at 1 (quoting Republican Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama, who voted
against conviction for perjury, as saying "'I've always said it ought to be beyond a
reasonable doubt, and I don't think they met it' "). The most curious example of this view
was Republican Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, who borrowed the Scottish standard
of "not proven" and refused to vote either guilty or not guilty. See Frank Bruni, The
President's Trial: The Renegades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at A23 (discussing Specter's
vote).
309. Democrat Sen. Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia stated that, while he believed the
president was guilty of removable offenses, he chose to acquit in the interests of the
country. See Mary McGrory, Relief and Long Faces, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1999, at BI
(discussing Byrd's vote); cf. Wendy Koch et al., Supporting Cast Stands Out, USA TODAY,
Feb. 15,1999, at 10A (noting the efforts of Republican Sen. Susan Collins of Maine to pass
a censure resolution "that would have declared the president guilty of perjury and
obstruction of justice but stopped short of removing him").
310. See Richard Whittle, Three Republicans Oppose Conviction, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 11, 1999, at A32 (noting that Republican Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont voted
against conviction for perjury and obstruction of justice because he believed the
President's actions did not rise to the level of removable offenses); see also id. (quoting
Republican Sen. Slade Gorton of Washington as voting against conviction for perjury on
the grounds that, although proven, the perjury did not "'rise to a level requiring
removal' "); Bresnahan & Keller, supra note 308, at 1 (quoting Republican Sen. Fred
Thompson of Tennessee as voting against conviction for perjury because " '[a]s bad and as
tacky as some of those things were, they probably were not the stuff that the Founding
Fathers were talking about' ").
311. See 146 CONG. REC. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (incorporating the vote count
for the second article of impeachment).
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memory, these varied justifications may be the most that academics
can assume from this record.
V. THE HISTORICAL MYTHOLOGIES OF IMPEACHMENT AND THE
HAMILTON AFFAIR
As Professor Paul Cohen has noted, "[t]he mythologized past
need not be historically accurate ... to be effective in persuading or
mobilizing people in the present," rather it only need be "bound by at
least a loose conception of 'truthfulness.' "312 The advancement of an
executive function theory necessarily raises the question why such a
theory should develop at this relatively late date in our constitutional
history. The explanation provided by its advocates is that the theory
was so deeply ingrained and understood by the Framers that they did
bother to state the obvious. Similarly, the advocates suggest that this
theory was always in the minds, but not the words or deeds, of past
representatives when pursuing impeachments. Support for this
theory, however, requires some evidence that the Framers were not
concerned with misdeeds or even crimes associated with private as
opposed to public affairs. This requires a historical exhumation and a
degree of contemporary spinning. The unfortunate victim was
Alexander Hamilton. The use of his affair with Maria Reynolds
confirmed Professor Cohen's observation that "mythologizers of the
past ... are uninterested in knowing the past as its makers have
experienced it."313
From the outset of the Clinton crisis, adultery was rejected as a
basis for impeachment by both political parties. The question was
solely whether President Clinton committed criminal acts in his effort
to cover-up his affair with Ms. Lewinsky.314 At the House Judiciary
Committee impeachment hearing, Professor Pollitl 5 and other
academics316 used the Hamilton affair to support the notion that
312. PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS: THE BOXERS AS EVENT,
EXPERIENCE, AND MYTH 214 (1997).
313. Id. at xiv.
314. It is ironic that the Hamilton affair would be used by the Clinton White House
and the Democratic members of Congress. After Hamilton had been cleared, this
accusation was used by Jeffersonian Republicans against Hamilton for political purposes.
After the administration of Andrew Jackson, the Republican Party of Jefferson became
known by its modem title, the Democratic Party. Thus, the use of this scandal represents
a degree of recidivism in the Democratic ranks.
315. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 208-09 (prepared statement of Professor
Pollitt).
316. See id at 56 n.54 (prepared statement of Professor Michael Gerhardt) (arguing
that the distinction between public and private conduct explains "why Alexander
Hamilton was never subjected to impeachment for having engaged (by his own admission)
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"[t]he Framers of our Constitution ... did not consider illicit sex, or
even lying about it, an impeachable offense. '317 Professor Pollitt's
account is certainly more measured than other accounts asserting that
Hamilton was found to have committed criminal acts or that he lied
about his affair.318 Professor Pollitt recounted before Congress the
Hamilton affair in detail, as well as similar affairs of Thomas
Jefferson and others.1 Professor Pollitt notes that "a muckraking
journalist" named James Callender320  suggested a "darker
entanglement" that went beyond Hamilton's affair with a married
woman.321 The record of this controversy deserves a brief review.
While I will not attempt to relate all of the details of this scandal, the
historical record contradicts rather than supports the executive
function theory. An investigation of Hamilton found only a sexual
scandal without any credible allegation of criminal conduct.322 The
conclusion to be drawn is that private conduct could be impeachable
only if there was evidence of some impeachable act beyond a
personal affair. Hamilton showed that there was no collateral crime
or public misdeed and, therefore, no impeachable offense.
The Hamilton affair began in July 1791 with a visit by Maria
Reynolds to Hamilton's U.S. Treasury Department office. Maria
Reynolds was from a respectable family in New York, 23 but she
in an adulterous affair with a married woman (whose husband then blackmailed Hamilton
to keep the liaison secret)." During my testimony, I contested the accounts of this affair
and its alleged support for an executive function theory. See id. at 273 n.31 (prepared
statement of Professor Turley). The suggestion that the public/private distinction is the
basis for this result is misplaced. As will be shown, the inquiry was directed at whether
criminality occurred regardless of the nature of the conduct. I present this
criminal/noncriminal distinction as an alternative view in Turley, Congress as Grand Jury,
supra note 17 (manuscript at Part I.C.), and New Originalists, supra note 54, at 27.
317. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 208 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt).
318. One example of the public presentation of the Hamilton affair was an ABC News
report asserting that Hamilton was guilty of paying "illegal bribes" to keep his affair quiet
but was not impeached. Good Morning America: Life After Impeachment (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1999), available in 1999 WL 10472910. This view apparently
was a direct result of the ubiquitous use of the affair by academics who supported
President Clinton's position. In fact, there is no evidence that paying money to a husband
was illegal in any fashion at the time. There was no criminality found in the affair, which is
the reason no impeachment developed.
319. See House Hearing, supra note 7, at 208-09 (prepared statement of Professor
Pollitt).
320. James Callender was the same journalist involved in the Chase impeachment.
Callender was a loathsome figure who has been described as "a little reptile." J. MILLER,
CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN SEDITION AcTs 211-20 (1951).
321. House Hearing, supra note 7, at 208 (prepared statement of Professor Pollitt).
322. See infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
323. Ms. Reynolds was the sister-in-law of Gilbert Livingston. See NOEMIE EMERY,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT 153 (1982); BROADUS MITCHELL,
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married into a less reputable family.324  Her husband, James
Reynolds, was a criminal and ne'er-do-well.32" When Maria married
into this family at the age of fifteen, James Reynolds's father, a
commissary in the Revolutionary Army, was in jail and James had
largely abandoned her.326 Witnesses would later recount that,
according to Maria, James Reynolds "'frequently enjoined and
insisted she should insinuate herself on certain high and influential
characters-endeavour to make assignations with them, and actually
prostitute herself to gull money from them.' ,327 Maria Reynolds and
Hamilton did "make assignations," and James Reynolds suddenly
appeared to ask for a position of a clerk at the Treasury Department,
which Hamilton refused.3H James Reynolds then returned weeks
later feigning outrage as a cuckold.329 Soon, however, he offered a
simple business proposition, writing to Hamilton: "'[G]ive me the
Sum of thousand dollars and I will leve the town and take my
daughter with me and go where my Friend Shant here from me and
leve her to Yourself to do for her as you thing proper.' "330 Reynolds
repeatedly demanded money from Hamilton, who usually consented
to the demands.331 Reynolds, however, soon found himself in jail for
fraud in an unrelated matter with an equally seedy cohort, Jacob
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A CONCISE BIOGRAPHY 318 (1976).
324. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 153-54.
325. See id.
326. See if-
327. Id. at 154 (quoting letter from James Folwell to Edward Jones (Aug. 12,1797)).
328. See id2 at 155. Reynolds told Hamilton that he could prove that William Duer at
the Treasury Department had given him a list of claims against the government as the
basis for speculation. In return for accusing Duer of wrongdoing, Reynolds hoped to
secure a job-a pattern of accusation for advancement or benefit that he would later
repeat with Hamilton's foes. See MITCHELL, supra note 323, at 319. This information,
however, was worthless and could have been picked up on the street since Duer had been
forced from office 18 months earlier. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 155.
329. James Reynolds wrote an initial letter to Hamilton that both witnesses and his
own later letter contradicted and demonstrated to be facially insincere:
"[Y]ou took the advantage [of] a poor Broken harted woman. instead of being a
Friend. you have acted the part of the most Cruelist man in existence. You have
made a whole family miserable. She ses there is no other man that she Care for
in this world. now Sir you have bin the Case of Cooling her affections for me.
She was a woman. I should as suspect [as] an angel from heven. and one where
all my happiness was depending.... But now I am determined to have
satisfaction. It shat be onely one family thats miserable."
JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 177 (1982) (quoting letter from James
Reynolds to Alexander Hamilton (Dec. 15, 1791)).
330. ROBERT A. HENDRICKSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
334 (1981) (quoting Dec. 19, 1791, letter from James Reynolds to Alexander Hamilton).
331. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 155-57.
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Clingman.332  Clingman was a former clerk to Pennsylvania
Congressman (and former Speaker of the House) A.C.
Muhlenberg.33  Reynolds and Clingman conveyed to Muhlenberg
from prison that Reynolds could "make disclosures injurious to the
character of some head of a Department. ''3 4 In return for restitution
and the information, Reynolds and Clingman wanted a dismissal of
the charges and release. This offer was conveyed to both Oliver
Wolcott, Comptroller of the Treasury (who informed Hamilton), as
well as to Muhlenberg.335 Reynolds and Clingman knew the value of
such accusations during this period of intense political rivalry.336
While a sexual scandal would offer little given Hamilton's reputation
for philandering, the anti-federalists loathed Hamilton, and three
ardent anti-federalists quickly responded to Reynolds and Clingman.
Muhlenberg, Representative Abraham B. Venable, and Senator (and
future President) James Monroe interviewed Reynolds, who accused
Hamilton of "'improper pecuniary speculations'" with him.337
Reynolds claimed in jail that he received the money from Hamilton,
not to extort but to engage in a conspiracy of speculation with the
Treasury Secretary. Reynolds's strategy succeeded: He was released
and then disappeared from the pages of history. The three men then
proceeded to interview Maria Reynolds, who denied any sexual
relationship with Hamilton and suggested that the affair was a cover
for business arrangements between her husband and Hamilton.
While it was understandable why the woman of a good family was
eager to refute allegations that her husband effectively prostituted
her to another man, Maria Reynolds's denial of a sexual relationship
332. Reynolds and Clingman were prosecuted for suborning perjury after they
attempted "to obtain letters of administration upon the estate of a claimant against the
United States who was still living" to collect a fraudulent payment. MITCHELL, supra note
323, at 320-21; see also COOKE, supra note 329, at 178 (describing the prosecution of
Reynolds and Clingman). This illegal transaction required the perjury of a third party,
John Delabar, so that Reynolds and Clingman could pose as executors of the estate. See
MARIE B. HECHT, ODD DESTINY: THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 331 (1982).
333. See COOKE, supra note 329, at 178.
334. HECHT, supra note 332, at 331.
335. See id.
336. Hamilton's political enemies actively spread the allegations of unlawful activities.
James Madison was particularly active in spreading the allegations. See id. at 338. John
Adams was less active in spreading the rumors as he was in denouncing Hamilton's
personal conduct. See id. at 344 (objecting to "the profligacy of his life; his fornications,
adulteries and his incests"; claiming that Hamilton suffered from "a superabundance of
secretions"; and concluding that he "could not find whores enough to draw off").
337. COOKE, supra note 329, at 179 (quoting letter from Hamilton to George
Washington (Mar. 7, 1796)); accord HENDRICKSON, supra note 330, at 369.
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was conclusively refuted by a series of letters in her hand33 and
statements of individuals corroborating Hamilton's account. 39
When the three members confronted Hamilton with the
allegations, they were surprised by his response. Hamilton
immediately confessed to the sexual affair and produced letters and
documents proving that an affair did occur between him and Maria
Reynolds. The response from Hamilton was so complete and
detailed that Venable actually asked Hamilton to stop presenting
evidence of his innocence when it was so clearly established, 34 ° and
Muhlenberg expressed shame to a friend of Hamilton in forcing the
disclosures."4 Hamilton turned over all of his documents to the three
men-a vital mistake. Monroe would take the only proof in
Hamilton's possession, and Hamilton would later be unable to
retrieve them. Some of these letters ended up in the hands of
Hamilton's foe, Thomas Jefferson.342  The letters also found their way
to John Beckley, the clerk of the House of Representatives, who has
been described as "an inveterate Hamilton baiter."3 3
Five years after the meeting exonerating Hamilton, the scandal
was publicly released through Callender's History of the United States
for 1796.? Callender reported that he had not only reviewed
Hamilton's letters but also had found that the three congressmen
338. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 323, at 320 (quoting a letter from Maria Reynolds
to Hamilton, which stated: "'I have kept my Bed those tow dayes and now rise from my
pillow which your Neglect has filled with the sharpest thorns ... I feel as If I should not
contennue long and all the wish I have Is to see you once more .... ."). Hamilton
produced Maria Reynolds's landlady and other evidence to prove that the letter was in
Maria's handwriting. See id. at 329 (noting "the sworn deposition of Mary Williams, a
Philadelphia boarding house keeper, that she was familiar with Maria Reynolds's
handwriting and that she endorsed as genuine the letters which Hamilton had shown her
and afterward had printed"). With one notable exception, virtually all of the historians
writing on this affair have concluded that Maria was lying. The editor of Jefferson's
papers, Julian Boyd, alleged that Hamilton may have forged the letters with intentional
misspellings to manufacture evidence of the affair. See HECHT, supra note 332, at 345.
339. One such witness, who had no connection to Hamilton, was a printer named
Richard Folwell, who knew Maria Reynolds well. Folwell stated that Maria was in the
habit of writing false letters of claimed innocence or hardship that "would move any one
almost to serve her, that was not perfectly acquainted with her Character." MITCHELL,
supra note 323, at 329.
340. See HECHT, supra note 332, at 334.
341. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 159 ("So grueling did Muhlenberg find the
experience that he later stopped [Oliver] Wolcott repeatedly on the sidewalk to express
his own embarrassment and his wish that he had not been present, and to insist that
though he disagreed with Hamilton on politics, he admired and liked him as a man.").
342. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 160 (noting that Jefferson took papers from
Monroe to his home in Virginia "where he kept them under seal").
343. COOKE, supra note 329, at 179.
344. See id. at 180.
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were unconvinced by Hamilton's explanation.'M 5 Callender, known as
a vindictive and vile muckraker, adopted Reynolds' account of a
faked sexual relationship to hide speculation. The release of the
letters coincided with a period of intense political discord in which
Hamilton was viewed as a threat by both Federalists like John Adams
as well as the Jeffersonian Republicans.346 Hamilton was incensed
because Monroe had promised to keep the documents under lock,
and the three members had sworn to keep the matter private. 47
Ultimately, the three congressmen publicly supported Hamilton's
account that he had been exonerated and that there was no evidence
of any illegality.3' Monroe was more guarded and clearly harbored
considerable dislike for Hamilton. 9 In response, Hamilton took an
extraordinary step. He published a long detailed account of his affair
345. See HECHT, supra note 332, at 336.
346. Hamilton remained popular in Congress and played a significant role in the 1796
elections against both Adams and Jefferson. See id. at 173-76; HENDRICKSON, supra note
330, at 454-55. During this period, Jefferson attempted to widen the rift between Adams
and Hamilton-though it hardly required the effort. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 330,
at 455. Jefferson's obvious efforts to undermine Hamilton led to a letter of mild rebuke
from Madison (his fellow Republican), who warned that Adams might suspect Jefferson of
"'a wish to make [Adams's] resentment [of Hamilton] an instrument for avenging that of
others.'" Id. (quoting letter from Madison to Jefferson). It was during this period of
intense political machinations that someone sent James Callender, the journalist,
Hamilton's letters proving the affair. Since Callender had previously baited Federalists
such as Adams (as detailed in the impeachment of Samuel Chase), he most likely received
the material from a Republican such as Monroe or one of Monroe's associates.
347. See MITCHELL, supra note 323, at 325 ("Monroe vouchsafed that he had 'sealed
up his copy of the papers ... and.., delivered them to his friend in Virginia-he... knew
nothing of their publication until he arrived at Philada from Europe and was sorry to find
they were published.' "). Hamilton was not convinced and Monroe did appear active in
fueling the rumors. For that reason, Hamilton demanded satisfaction in a duel, which was
avoided only by the ironic intervention of Aaron Burr. See HECHT, supra note 332, at 341.
348. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 330, at 476 (noting that the congressmen agreed
that Hamilton's explanations "'removed the suspicions we had before entertained of your
being connected with [Reynolds] in speculation' " (quoting joint statement of Monroe and
Muhlenberg)).
349. See MITCHELL, supra note 323, at 326-27. Monroe's dislike would only grow with
time. Not only did Monroe share the intense hostility of Republicans of the time, but he
also blamed Hamilton for a variety of difficulties. This list of particulars included Jay's
Treaty, which Monroe had to defend as Ambassador to France and which he viewed as an
"'evil'" creation of Hamilton. HENDRICKSON, supra note 330, at 456 (quoting Monroe).
It is interesting that, during this period, John Quincy Adams reported that Monroe was
spreading a scandalous rumor among local media that Jay also was guilty of corruption.
See id (noting that Monroe actively spread rumors that Jay "had been taking bribes in
London and that the House of Representatives had also been bribed to give its final three-
vote margin of funding approval to the treaty"). While Monroe would disavow knowledge
of the release of Hamilton's letters and the scandalous account reported by Callender, his
involvement would have been consistent with his attacks on Hamilton during this period.
See id. (noting Monroe's criticisms of Hamilton because of the Jay Treaty).
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with Maria Reynolds that was excruciating in its detail and self-
condemnation. °
The scandal ended badly for everyone involved. Hamilton died
at the hands of Aaron Burr a few years later. 1  Maria Reynolds
would later marry her husband's co-conspirator, Jacob Clingman.
35 2
Monroe was shunned for his conduct by some, including Hamilton's
wife, even after his presidency 5 3 The only tangible benefit to the
scandal was not realized until 208 years later, when a president facing
impeachment needed a historical context for a mythological tale.
Both politicians354 and academics355 who opposed impeachment
350. See Alexander Hamilton, Observations on Certain Documents (The Reynolds
Pamphlet), in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 369 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.
1903) [hereinafter WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON].
351. Burr would kill Hamilton in a duel at Weehawken, New Jersey. Interestingly,
Burr was a figure on the edges of the Hamilton affair. Hamilton and Monroe were set to
duel over their disagreement and Monroe selected Burr as his second. See HECHT, supra
note 332, at 341. Burr proceeded to convince both men not to duel, thereby possibly
saving Monroe for the presidency and saving Hamilton for himself only a few years later.
When Mary Reynolds sought a divorce from her husband to marry Jacob Clingman, Burr
served as her lawyer. See EMERY, supra note 323, at 160.
352. Roughly a year after the scandal, Mrs. Reynolds was living in Maryland as Mrs.
Clingman. See HECHT, supra note 332, at 340. She asked a prior acquaintance, printer
Richard Folwell, for a letter of "clear character" but was refused: "Folwell answered the
notorious Mrs. Reynolds by telling her that her character was not even worse because Mr.
Reynolds was alive in New York." Id. Maria Reynolds insisted that "her only fault was
that she had married Clingman one half hour before she obtained her divorce, but Folwell
[still] refused to give her good character." Id.
353. Monroe called upon Mrs. Hamilton after his term in office to ask forgiveness, but
Mrs. Hamilton replied: "'Mr. Monroe, if you have come to tell me that you repent, that
you are sorry, very sorry, for ... the slanders ... you circulated against my dear husband
... I understand it. But, otherwise, no lapse of time, no nearness to the grave, makes nay
difference.' " MITCHELL, supra note 323, at 420 (quoting a third party account of the
meeting between Madison and Mrs. Hamilton).
354. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H9209-10 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Maurice Hinchey, Democrat from New York, relying on the Hamilton affair to support his
opposition to impeachment); Dennis Camire, La 's Senators Vote to Acquit Clinton,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6962259 (noting that Sen.
John Brueaux, Democrat from Louisiana, relied on Hamilton's affair as evidence that
concealing an affair is not impeachable).
355. See, e.g., Rivera Live: Judiciary Committee Hears Testimony in the House from
Scholars Regarding the Definition of an Impeachable Offense (CNBC television broadcast,
Nov. 9, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5034517 (remarks of Professor Paul Rothstein). One
of the signatories of the law professors' letter, Professor Rothstein noted Geraldo Rivera's
statement to the effect that the Founding Fathers "didn't contemplate that a cover-up of a
... sexual affair would be an impeachable offense" and stated:
[L]o and behold, there is a historical event that corroborates just what you've
said. Alexander Hamilton, when he was secretary of George Washington's
Treasury, was engaged in an extramarital affair, and he was paying off the
husband to keep it quiet. And Congress, with all these Founding Fathers sitting
in Congress who had written the Constitution, they thought that Alexander
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or removal of President Clinton used the Hamilton affair as partial
justification for their positions. During the impeachment debate in
the House, one Democratic member inserted into the record the
account of the affair presented by historian Richard Rosenfeld, a
proponent of the executive function theory:
"[O]n the day the founders defined an impeachable offense,
they declared their unanimous intention to limit high crimes
and misdemeanors to be actions against the United States.
Not private misconduct, unrelated to the operation of
government, not sexual misconduct or even lies to cover it
up.
... Hamilton was forced to admit the payments, but
explained them as hush money to avoid public disclosure of
adultery he had been committing with James Reynolds'
wife.... Hamilton got Mrs. Reynolds to burn some
incriminating letters and he offered to pay travel expenses if
Reynolds would get out of town.
' '356
This account ignores the fact that the purpose of the
investigation into the affair was to determine if criminal acts occurred
regardless of the nature of the conduct.35 7  Moreover, Hamilton
Hamilton was involved in a bribery episode where people were buying
government favors. But when they opened it up and found out it was just
covering up a sexual affair, they all said, "No, no impeachment, no
impeachment," and Hamilton went on to ever greater glory.
Id. In reality, it does not appear that other members of Congress knew of this issue
beyond the three anti-federalists, although a few may have heard from later accounts.
Once again, the use of the affair appears to suggest that acts taken in the course of a
cover-up of a sexual affair are not relevant to impeachment. No such determination was
ever made; rather, if anyone ever said "no, no impeachment," it was because of the
absence of criminal acts. Similarly, no one ever suggested that President Clinton should
be impeached for the mere fact of adultery, but rather for criminal acts to cover-up his
adulterous affair.
356. 144 CONG. REC. H9209 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1998) (inserting into the record the
transcript of an interview with historian Richard Rosenfeld on National Public Radio
("NPR")).
357. The reference to the burning of the letters may also be misleading. It was
standard in that age for writers to burn personal letters. Such actions seem more sinister
today. While formal letters were often written with remarkable prose and care, every day
correspondence often amounted to mere passing (and often unguarded) notes, as the
preserved correspondence in the Hamilton affair demonstrates. Other leaders of that time
asked that letters be routinely destroyed, including Aaron Burr who before his duel with
Hamilton instructed his daughter to burn his correspondence with female acquaintances.
See HECH'T, supra note 332, at 417. This is not to disregard any destruction of letters as
relevant to a review of Hamilton's conduct; it is only to suggest that such destruction of
letters is consistent with the time and Hamilton's stated purpose in avoiding public
embarrassment. When confronted, however, Hamilton gave a full and detailed account.
See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
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immediately admitted the relationship, and it was Reynolds-not
Hamilton-who made passing reference to leaving town with the
money from Hamilton."
When the actual (rather than the mythological) account is
considered, the comparison works to the detriment of President
Clinton. When first confronted about the Reynolds affair, Hamilton
immediately admitted the affair and gave so many damaging personal
details that his interlocutors begged him to stop. When first
confronted with the Lewinsky affair, Clinton went on national
television to deny publicly the relationship; told his staffers that
Lewinsky was a stalker; and spent seven months orchestrating a
campaign of deception. President Clinton's specific public
explanation was: "I never had a sexual relationship with that woman,
Ms. Lewinsky."35 9  When Hamilton's affair was first raised, he
immediately turned over all of his documents to three anti-federalists
in addition to speaking openly for hours about the affair. When the
affair was made public, he published a 28,000-word account of his
affair to his considerable personal and professional detriment. His
response, with attached exhibits and letters, was overwhelming
evidence, as was his open admission of infidelity. Hamilton stated:
This confession is not made without a blush. I cannot
be the apologist of any vice because the ardor of passion
may have made it mine. I can never cease to condemn
myself .... The necessity of it to my defence against a more
heinous charge could alone have extorted from me so
painful an indecorum.
... No man not indelicately unprincipled, with the state of
358. Richard Rosenfeld concluded his NPR interview with the baffling statement that
"'the founding fathers saw a big difference between public service and private conduct,
and on the question of impeachment they warned Congress to do the same.'" 144 CONG.
REC. H9210 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1998) (incorporating transcript of the NPR interview).
There is little question that the Framers saw the difference between public and private
conduct, but they certainly did not warn anyone about its use in impeachment. As the
Hamilton affair demonstrates, the operative question is criminality in the conduct and not
its motive or context.
359. President Clinton's famous finger-waving denial of any sexual relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky was unequivocal and false:
But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to me.
I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms.
Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time, never. These allegations
are false, and I need to go back to work for the American people. Thank you.
145 CONG. REC. S1290 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999) (incorporating President Clinton's
statement).
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manners in this country, would be willing to have a conjugal
infidelity fixed upon him with positive certainty. He would
know that it would justly injure him with a considerable and
respectable portion of the society; and especially no man,
tender of the happiness of an excellent wife, could, without
extreme pain, look forward to the affliction which she might
endure from the disclosure, especially a public disclosure of
the fact. Those best acquainted with the interior of my
domestic life will best appreciate the force of such a
consideration upon me.
The truth was, that in both relations, and especially the
last, I dreaded extremely a disclosure-and was willing to
make large sacrifices to avoid it.
Thus has my desire to destroy this slander completely
led me to a more copious and particular examination of it,
than I am sure was necessary.
3 60
There is no evidence or indication that Hamilton ever lied in
private interviews or public accounts concerning the relations. While
it is not legally possible to defame the dead, the comparison of
Hamilton's actions to the Clinton case borders on the defamatory.
Rather than debate "what the meaning of the word 'is' is, 361
Hamilton left virtually no detail to the imagination in his effort to put
any questions to rest.
The Hamilton affair, therefore, contradicts its mythological use.
The investigation of Hamilton ended when the three investigators
determined that there was no evidence of criminal conduct but only a
sordid affair. The investigation demonstrated that sexual affairs
could become impeachable offenses only if collateral acts of
criminality developed in the course of the scandal. If Hamilton had
engaged in speculation or any other criminal act, it is doubtful that
these three anti-federalists would have hesitated to bring charges.
The record is abundantly clear on one point: There was never any
suggestion that Hamilton could be impeached or punished for the
affair. The investigators followed the same presumptions as the
House managers in the Clinton trial-Hamilton's sexual affair would
only be an impeachable subject only if Hamilton engaged in unlawful
360. WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 350, at 378-79,407,411.
361. APPENDICES TO THE REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HousE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(C)
SUBMITED BY THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, H.R. Doc. No. 105-311, at 510
(transcript of Aug. 17, 1998, grand jury testimony of President William J. Clinton).
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activity. Unlike the Clinton case, there was no such evidence of
criminality by Alexander Hamilton. The most generous view of its
use in the Clinton impeachment debates is that it is an example of
what Professor Gordon referred to as "bad mythmaking.
'362
VI. CONCLUSION
All mythologies, constitutional or literary, have an underlying
purpose or theme. Presented with complex facts or realities,
mythology offers a consistent account to an audience eager for clarity.
At a time of national crisis, the desire for a clear basis of resolution is
almost overwhelming. In such times, we often look to the Framers to
compel a course of action. This desire for a dead-hand control over
contemporary problems is understandable but not always
supportable. Ironically, the only clear intent of the Framers on some
questions was to leave the resolution of conflicts to each generation.
The Framers often were more concerned with how we would
conclude conflicts than the conclusions themselves. This appears to
have been the resolution over the impeachment language. Faced with
various views of the basis for impeachment, the Framers focused on
where and how impeachment would occur. The evolutionary
standard of impeachment, "high crimes and misdemeanors," would
necessarily change with society, but the static procedural conditions
would remain constant. Thus, society may come to view certain acts
of misconduct as impeachable that were not even viewed as
objectionable-let alone actionable-in the 1700s. This places a
heavy burden on each generation to define their expectations of a
president-a burden that would be lightened considerably by a theory
of original intent.
The executive function theory advances a view of the presidency
that truly is suited for our time. The theory reflects a social and
political shift in how we view the presidency. While the Framers
referred to the president as the "Chief Magistrate," the modern
tendency is to view the president as the chief executive officer of a
public company 63 We may abhor the chief executive officer's
personal conduct and yet consider the conduct irrelevant to the
corporation's performance. This may be the emerging view of voters
in the twenty-first century. It is not, however, a view that fairly can be
attributed to the Framers in the Eighteenth Century. It is, instead, an
362. Gordon, supra note 47, at 1055.
363. Jonathan Turley, You Don't Impeach a Chief Executive Officer..., NAT'L L.,
Mar. 1, 1999, at A22.
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idea to fit our time. It should be defended with our own voice and
not that of the Framers.3 64 In this sense, the executive function theory
and its supporting historical accounts lead to a question once asked
about "mythistory": "Does it dream to life the kind of past we
require to guarantee the kind of future we seek?"365
364. See High Crimes and Misdemeanors, supra note 54, at A23; New Originalists,
supra note 54, at 27.
365. Paul Horwitz, The Past Tense: The History of Crisis-and the Crisis of History-in
Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459,506 (1997) (book review).
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